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For the past three decades, plaintiffs in hundreds of state and federal 
court lawsuits have challenged state laws that fund public schools with the 
local property tax. As socioeconomic segregation remains at extremely 
high levels across the country, reliance on a tax that is based on the wealth 
of the property within a school district’s territory produces huge inequality 
in revenues. As the result of numerous court opinions, legislative reforms, 
and public pressure, many states have revised their funding formula to 
shift some of the burden to the state level. However, notwithstanding the 
wide-ranging statutory amendments and increased state funding, the 
tremendous gap between wealthy and poor districts remains. In some cases 
the gap has increased, even in many of those states whose highest courts 
have invalidated their school finance statutes. This Article asserts that this 
entrenched inequality stems from two related facts: first, that the local 
property tax remains the single most important source of public school 
dollars; and second, that most state finance reforms have left untouched 
the ability of school districts to raise as much money from the local 
property tax as the district’s property owners will tolerate. 
This Article considers the insights of Professor Robert Frank’s book 
Luxury Fever and explores the spending patterns of wealthy school 
districts. It concludes, much like Frank concluded in his analysis of the 
private consumer market, that unchecked taxing and spending powers have 
created a pattern of luxury spending by the nation’s wealthy school 
districts. It then evaluates, and rejects, the arguments used by those who 
support the preservation of unlimited local taxing discretion. Subsequent 
sections describe the statutory schemes of those few states that have 
purported to implement caps, showing how the caps themselves typically 
contain so many exemptions and exceptions that they fail to impose a real 
limit on wealthy district spending. Suggesting that it is time to reconsider 
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the widespread support of the local property tax for school funding, this 
Article concludes by proposing that states completely replace the local 
property tax with a statewide tax on real property and narrowly limit the 
ability of wealthy districts to “overspend.” Although the proposals leave 
unanswered many difficult questions about educational policy and equal 
school funding, this Article concludes that a cap on school district taxing 
powers is a fundamental prerequisite to meaningful school finance reform.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
After more than 30 years of school finance litigation in state and 
federal courts, numerous statutory reform measures, and countless 
scholarly articles, elementary and secondary education in the United States 
appears to be stuck in a permanent crisis mode. With some notable 
exceptions, and notwithstanding continuously increasing levels of school 
funding,1 student achievement levels remain unsatisfactory,2 the disparities 
between wealthy and poor districts remain,3 and litigation over school 
spending continues at a steady pace.4 It is not for lack of statutory 
experimentation or novel legal argumentation that American education has 
not lived up to the standards enshrined in many state constitutional 
guarantees of “a general, suitable and efficient system [of education]”5 or 
“an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions.”6
In most states, in spite of widespread litigation and legislative reform, 
the most important single source of revenue for elementary and secondary 
schools is still the local property tax.7 The amount of money generated by 
 1. According to one prominent scholar in the debate over school finance, per-pupil spending has 
risen “from $164 in 1890 . . . to $4622 in 1990, roughly quintupling in each fifty-year period.” ERIC A. 
HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS 
27 (1994). 
 2. See infra note 23.  
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
 4. Noting that in 2001, lawsuits were “pending or planned” in 45 states, one author concluded 
that the issue of school funding “is not going away anytime soon.” David Brunori, Political, Legal 
Crises Plague School Finance, 20 ST. TAX NOTES 339, 340 (2001).  
 5. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
 6. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
 7. Nationally, local revenues account for 44% of total public school expenditures. U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC., NAT’L. CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, FINANCING ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATION IN THE STATES: 1997–98, at tbl.A-1 (1997). A comparison of individual states, however, 
reveals a substantial range. New Mexico, whose schools receive a scant 10% of their revenues from 
local property taxes, approximately, is the state with least dependence on property taxes. Id. At the 
other end of the spectrum, in 1997 New Hampshire generated nearly 67% of its school funds from that 
source. Id. State funding levels, however, are increasing. In 1992, state funding constituted half or 
more of elementary and secondary education spending in thirty states. Michael F. Addonizio, Equality 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/3













that tax is a function of two crucial variables: the tax rate levied and the 
value of the property within the taxing district’s boundaries.8 The results 
are inevitable: districts with high property value within their borders will 
be able to generate more revenue, frequently applying a much lower tax 
rate, than those with less.9 In numerous lawsuits, plaintiffs have 
challenged this financial disparity using a variety of legal theories, arguing 
that something is amiss when the quality of educational opportunity 
available to America’s children crucially depends on the value of the 
property located in their school districts. Frequently, the differences reach 
dramatic proportions—in Texas, for instance, the disparity in property 
values between wealthiest and poorest school districts reflected a 700 to 1 
ratio.10 In terms of dollars spent per pupil, though the numbers are less 
extreme than those documenting disparity in property values, wealthy 
districts may outspend poor districts by a factor of two or three.11
In response to the so-called “waves”12 of school finance litigation that 
have spanned the last few decades, and also in response to public demands 
for educational improvement, legislators in numerous states have adopted 
wide-ranging reforms of their school funding schemes. In some states, the 
or Choice? School Finance Reform and the Income-Expenditure Relationship, 23 J. EDUC. FIN. 22, 22 
(1997). 
 8. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 317, 548–51 (6th ed. 2004). 
 9. According to a federal study, on a nationwide basis, “most poor districts tax themselves at 
higher rates than those in wealthy districts.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: 
STATE EFFORTS TO EQUALIZE FUNDING BETWEEN WEALTHY AND POOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS 2 (1998) 
[hereinafter STATE EFFORTS]. In Texas, for instance, in 1985–1986, the 100 poorest school districts 
had a tax rate that was nearly double the tax rate for the 100 wealthiest districts, yet the poor districts 
generated less than half the revenue. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 
S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989). 
 10. Id. at 392.  
 11. See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ark. 1983); Tenn. Small 
Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Tenn. 1993); John Schomberg, Equity v. Autonomy: 
The Problems of Private Donations to Public Schools, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 143, 145 n.12 (citing 
figures that show that in 1986–1987, the ten highest-spending school districts in New York spent 2.6 
times more on a per-pupil basis than the ten lowest). A General Accounting Office study describes 
how Minnesota plaintiffs showed that, in 1989, the wealthiest 10% of school districts raised on 
average six times more revenue than the poorest 10% through a particular tax levy, even though the 
poorest districts’ tax rates were about 25% higher. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: 
THREE STATES’ EXPERIENCES WITH EQUITY IN SCHOOL FUNDING 7 (1995) [hereinafter THREE 
STATES]; see also William T. Hartman, Education Funding Disparities: What Do the Dollars Buy?, 24 
J. EDUC. FIN. 389, 389 (1999) (noting that differences between wealthy and poor school districts by a 
factor of two or three are “not uncommon”). Overall nationwide data confirms the gap: wealthy 
districts on average provide 24% more funding per pupil than poor districts. See STATE EFFORTS, 
supra note 9, at 2.  
 12. The term is used frequently in the literature to describe several stages of school finance 
litigation. The three waves are described in infra text accompanying notes 26–54. 
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legislatures have refused to upset the underlying principles that allocate 
revenue to schools, preferring instead to adopt modest changes that can be 
touted in political campaigns as evidence of the legislators’ commitment 
to education.13 In other states, however, the statutory revisions have 
produced fundamental overhauls of education funding,14 adopting new 
financing mechanisms that attempt to close the gap between wealthy and 
poor and to guarantee that children in school will in fact be educated 
during the hours they spend there. Overwhelmingly though, whether the 
reforms be minimal or substantial, most states have not interfered with the 
ability of school districts to generate as much money as local property 
values and local political acceptance of higher tax rates will tolerate. In 
some districts, the presence of valuable non-residential property means 
that the property tax will generate high revenues at a low taxing rate; in 
other wealthy districts, high per-pupil funds depend on the assent of the 
wealthy residential property owners to tax themselves at high rates. 
Whatever the source of the revenues, legislators tend to tread very lightly 
when it comes to interfering with the ability of a local district to generate 
local revenues for local schools. 
For the most part, courts and commentators concur with that prevalent 
legislative consensus. Widespread support defends the proposition that 
legislatures should maintain their hands-off policy vis-a-vis the property-
wealthy, high revenue-raising districts. Coalescing under the broad rubric 
 13. Legislative reluctance to adopt significant reform in the wake of judicial invalidation of 
existing statutory schemes frequently provokes protracted battles between the legislature and the 
judiciary. For example, when the Texas Supreme Court invalidated its statutory school funding scheme 
in 1989, it took six years and three more supreme court opinions for the legislature to produce what the 
court described as “minimally acceptable.” Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 
S.W.2d 717, 726 (Tex. 1995). In a more recent case involving the same statute, the court noted how 
the legislature has amended the Education Code during each legislative session between 1993 and 
2003, with little change in school funding patterns. W. Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 
S.W.3d 558, 572 (Tex. 2003). For a detailed account of the Edgewood litigation, see J. Steven Farr & 
Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 607 (1999). More recently, in Ohio, the supreme court issued its fourth opinion in ongoing 
litigation over school funding. In DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2002), the court 
overruled its earlier decision to leave the reform of school funding to legislative prerogative, 
explaining that its decision was prompted by the legislature’s failure to respond to the court’s mandate 
of “a complete systematic overhaul” of school funding. See id. (quoting DeRolph v. State (De Rolph 
I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997)). One commentator speculates that wealthy districts have been quite 
powerful roadblocks to meaningful legislative reform. Kirk Vandersall, Post-Brown School Finance 
Reform, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY 7, 20 (Marilyn Gittel ed., 1998). 
 14. For instance, one commentator describes the state’s legislative response to the Kentucky 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), as 
perhaps “the most comprehensive . . . statewide education reforms in the nation.” Molly A. Hunter, All 
Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 485 
(1999).  
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of local control, defenders of the status quo emphasize that wealthy 
districts have voluntarily, and commendably, assumed the burden of 
higher taxes in exchange for excellent schools. Even those who litigate on 
behalf of poor, underfinanced school systems frequently make the strategic 
decision not to challenge the taxing and spending prerogatives of the 
wealthiest districts.15 Limiting spending in those school districts, the 
common wisdom goes, would have numerous disadvantages.16  
As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that in most states, school 
districts retain the ability to set their own upper limits on spending. 
Though statutory reform may push up the bottom to ensure that all 
districts receive at least a certain minimum level of per-pupil dollars, only 
a few states have dared to limit the expenditures at the top.17 In those 
unusual states, the cap on school spending is generally accomplished in 
one of two ways. One approach establishes a cap on the amount of money 
a district may spend per pupil.18 The other allows wealthy districts to 
generate more than a state-mandated amount of per-pupil revenue, but 
imposes a recapture provision that reallocates those funds that exceed a 
statutorily determined maximum.19 In essence, the recapture provisions 
transfer locally-raised revenues according to state plan, either to a state 
education fund or directly to poor or low-performing districts.  
To say that much has been written about school finance reform is a 
tremendous understatement. Numerous books, articles, appellate briefs, 
and judicial opinions have documented the extent of the disparity between 
rich and poor districts, debated the theories of school finance reform, and 
argued about where school funds should come from and how they should 
be spent. This Article takes on only one important issue embedded in all of 
those debates, and urges reconsideration of the prevalent assessments of 
spending by the states’ wealthiest school districts. Specifically, it suggests 
that public education has fallen prey to the same “Luxury Fever” spending 
 15. One account of the drama behind Kentucky’s school finance reform details how the 
proponents “advocated an infusion of funds and ‘leveling up,’” and their firm commitment not to “take 
resources away from any district.” Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics of Reform: 
Lessons from School Finance Litigation in Kentucky, 1984–1995, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 631, 649 
(2001).  
 16. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 79–103.  
 17. See John Augenblick, The Role of State Legislatures in School Finance Reform: Looking 
Backward and Looking Ahead, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY 89, 93 (Marilyn Gittell ed., 1998) 
(describing Colorado and Washington as “among the very few states that place limits on how much 
revenue school districts can choose to raise on their own,” and Montana and Wyoming as using a 
“recapture” method to produce district equality).  
 18. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 108–45.  
 19. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 146–203.  
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patterns identified by Professor Robert Frank in his book by the same 
name.20 As a review of school district spending will confirm, the luxury 
spending phenomenon is discernible in the habits of the country’s 
wealthiest school districts.21 And as their per-pupil expenditures rise 
rapidly, other districts are forced to try to keep up.22 With no meaningful 
increases in student achievement, however, and with widespread gaps 
between the top and the bottom, we are left to wonder whether the money 
 20. ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS 
(1999). In his analysis of the private consumer market, Frank noted how incomes at the high end have 
recently skyrocketed, how spending on luxury goods has increased at a disproportionate rate, and how 
that increase has produced a never-ending upward spiral by lower-end consumers seeking to keep up 
with the top. Id. at 14–32. For instance, the earnings of the highest 1% of the U.S. population have 
doubled since 1989. The number of people with incomes of more than $150,000 also doubled between 
1980 and 1990. Id. at 33; see also LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC 344, 395–96 (2003) 
(noting that between 1980 and 2000, the income of the nation’s top 5% of families increased from 
14.6% to 20.8% of the total national income). On that basis, Professor Frank concluded that “people 
who had a lot of money to begin with have considerably more now, and there are also many more 
people with a lot of money than there used to be.” FRANK, supra, at 34. This growing disparity 
between rich and poor extends far beyond the frequently cited gap between the incomes of CEOs and 
average workers. Id. at 33 (noting that in 1973, the average CEO earned 35 times as much as the 
average worker, while today the CEO’s salary outpaces the average workers’ by a factor of 200). 
Another indicator of income disparity is the fact that the top 20% of the population earns 56% of the 
income. Ray Boshara, Poverty is More Than a Matter of Income, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2002, at D13. 
Moreover, in terms of asset accumulation, the top 20% of the population now holds 83% of the wealth. 
Id. In addition, between 1993 and 1998, asset poverty rose 14%. Id. Professor Frank found that the 
excess of disposable cash at the top of the wealth ladder has fueled a remarkable spiral of what Frank 
has dubbed “Luxury Fever,” in which the amount of money used to buy luxury goods is increasing at 
four times the rate of overall national spending. FRANK, supra, at 267. Seeking to keep up with that 
frenetic pace, Americans with lower incomes are imitating the spending patterns at the top. As a result, 
the rate at which Americans save is down by 40% since 1980, credit card debt is up 60% since 1989, 
and bankruptcy filings in 1997 reached an all time high of 1.4 million, one for every 70 households in 
the country. Id. at 45–48. Bankruptcy filings recently hit the one million mark, and the rate reflects a 
400% rise in filings for individuals over recent years. Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of 
American Bankruptcy Reform, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 195 (1999). 
 21. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 104–255.  
 22. In his book, Frank suggests an explanation for the continued acceleration of luxury spending. 
First, he argues, counter to classic economic assumptions, happiness may depend more on an 
individual’s relative position in society than on his or her absolute amount of wealth. FRANK, supra 
note 20, at 109. In his exploration of the incentives that mold patterns of individual consumption, 
Frank identifies the importance of relative position to individual consumers and the way in which the 
importance of that position fuels the Luxury Fever spending spiral. Id. at 109–11. For example, 
consider the simple but representative example of luxury watches. If the once trend-setting $20,000 
watch becomes widely consumed and displayed, I will not call attention with a similarly priced watch; 
only a more expensive watch, say a $30,000 model, will do. That distinction is temporary, however, as 
those with $20,000 watches will then strive to outshine my $30,000 purchase. As they do so, the 
impact of their behavior on my spending is completely predictable: to save my position at the top, I 
must find new, more expensive products that are out of reach for those below me. That “top,” of 
course, is a moving target, and requires constant upping of the ante to maintain the distinction. Id. at 
146–58. 
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we are “throwing”23 at our most lavishly funded schools is indeed money 
well spent. Whether the doctrinal rubric of the state’s school finance 
reform movement be equality, adequacy, or some other legal principle,24 
the contention here is that the unchecked, and ever upward, trajectory of 
wealthy school district spending has profoundly negative consequences for 
the future of public school finance. If this insight is correct, the conclusion 
is inescapable that the vast majority of school funding reform is seriously 
flawed. Only those few states that have dared to limit revenue raising and 
spending by the wealthiest school districts are on the right track. However, 
as later parts of this Article will argue, even those serious reform efforts 
have defects that compromise their workability.25
This Article begins with a brief review of the legal theories that have 
fueled school finance litigation, a description of the prevalence of luxury 
spending in public education, and a defense of the Article’s central claim 
that state law should impose limits on local school district taxing and 
spending powers. Subsequent sections evaluate the statutory schemes of 
those few states that purport to check the upward spiral of school 
spending. The Article then reflects on how current local governmental 
structures have tolerated, and indeed strengthened, luxury spending in 
public education. It concludes by suggesting several important ways in 
which reform efforts should be refocused. Though the conclusion does not 
presume to offer a magical solution for funding formulas or a definitive 
 23. This term is frequently used in the debate over whether states that “throw” money at poor 
school districts realize any demonstrable benefit from that spending. The work of Eric Hanushek is at 
the forefront of the literature whose studies of under-achieving districts conclude that “expenditures 
are not systematically related to student achievement.” Eric A. Hanushek, The Impact of Differential 
Expenditures on School Performance, 18 EDUC. RESEARCHER 45, 50 (1989); see also Eric A. 
Hanushek, Throwing Money at Schools, 1 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 19 (1981). Defendants in 
school finance litigation frequently use Hanushek’s claims to argue against increased spending for low 
achieving districts. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 117–18, 139–40 (Ala. 1993); 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 494, 507, 510–11, 520 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), 
rev’d, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), aff’d as modified by 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003); 
Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *56 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 
12, 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004). Some might find irony in the fact 
that the same defendants who assert the lack of correlation between student achievement and money 
vigorously defend the power of rich districts to spend lavishly on their own students. The principle 
seems to be that it is foolish to throw money at poor schools but not at wealthy ones. Moreover, in 
recent funding litigation the court noted that Dr. Hanushek testified, not that “money doesn’t matter,” 
but rather that “money spent wisely, logically, and with accountability would be very useful indeed [to 
closing the achievement gap].” Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *49 (Kan. 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003). In fact, Hanushek concluded by agreeing that “[o]nly a fool would say money 
doesn’t matter.” Id.  
 24. For a review of the legal theories used in school funding litigation, see infra discussion at text 
accompanying notes 26–54. 
 25. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 104–255. 
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resolution of the many disputes over the proper allocation of governmental 
power in education, it suggests several important components of 
successful and equitable school finance reform. Specifically, the Article 
urges abolition of the local property tax for school funding and adoption of 
a statewide property tax, with revenues allocated on the basis of student 
educational needs rather than on the basis of district property wealth. In 
addition, it recommends that states tolerate some luxury spending by local 
districts in excess of the state equalized formula, but that the spending be 
steeply taxed, so as to limit the upward trajectory of school district funding 
patterns.  
II. MONEY AND INEQUALITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
A. A Brief History of School Funding Litigation 
As numerous commentators have explained, school funding litigation 
is traditionally referred to in waves.26 The first wave, disappointingly short 
for its proponents, used the huge disparity between wealthy and poor 
school districts as the basis of a federal equal protection challenge.27 The 
documented inequality was staggering, and the plaintiffs were able to 
garner judicial concern for their plight.28 In the end, though, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez29 closed the federal courthouse door to those seeking to attack 
entrenched financial inequality in school district finance. Relying on the 
importance of local control in public education,30 and describing its doubts 
 26. For some of the vast literature discussing the three waves of school finance litigation, see, for 
example, Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School 
Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 
571–79 (1998) [hereinafter Heise, Hollow Victories]; Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School 
Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995) 
[hereinafter Heise, Third Wave]; Gail F. Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to 
Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507 (1991); William E. Thro, Judicial 
Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decisions as a 
Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994); William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, 
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & 
EDUC. 219 (1990). 
 27. See supra note 26. 
 28. See William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriquez: Ending the 
Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and 
Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721, 721–32 (1992). The author asserts that although the entire United 
States Supreme Court recognized a “fundamental wrong,” inherent in the Texas school funding 
system, a majority was not persuaded that the remedy sought would be effective. Id. at 721 (citing San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)). 
 29. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.  
 30. The Court explained the importance of local control to public education:  
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about the alleged connection between school district spending and quality 
of education,31 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a school finance 
system based on local property taxes.32  
Rebuffed in federal courts, the second wave brought the equality theory 
to state courts.33 In those cases, the plaintiffs continued to highlight the 
unfairness and inequality inherent in a system in which school funds 
depended on the wealth of the district in which the school was located. 
The success rate of the second wave, though better than the first, was 
mixed.34 And even when state courts ordered legislative reform targeted at 
ending the revenue disparity between rich and poor districts, the gaps 
persisted.35 In part, the preservation of inequality may be due to the fact 
that most judicial equalization decrees spurred the passage of legislation 
that strove to attain “taxpayer equality” rather than equality of school 
revenues or equality of educational opportunity. In those funding schemes, 
commonly referred to as “district power equalizer”36 formulas, every 
school district that taxed at the state-specified levy was assured of state 
supplementation to bring its revenues up to a guaranteed level of 
funding.37 At the same time, though, wealthy school districts were left free 
to continue to generate higher levels of property tax revenue. As a result, 
In part, local control means . . . the freedom to devote more money to the education of one’s 
children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity it offers for participation in the 
decisionmaking process that determines how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each 
locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity 
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. . . . No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a 
diversity of approaches than does public education. 
Id. at 49–50. 
 31. The Court noted the “unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of education may 
be determined by the amount of money expended for it.” Id. at 23–24. 
 32. Id. at 47. 
 33. The terms “equality” and “equity” have been used interchangeably to refer to the doctrinal 
basis of this second wave of school finance litigation. See William E. Thro, Judicial Paradigms of 
Educational Equality, 174 ED. L. REP. 1, 30–31 n.107 (2003).  
 34. According to one count, of the 20 equality cases brought in state court, only seven were 
successful. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 267 nn.74–75 (1999) 
[hereinafter Ryan, Race and Money].  
 35. One study of Texas school finance noted that in 1996–1997, years after the Texas Supreme 
Court had ordered equalization, the gap between wealthy and poor districts in terms of per-pupil funds 
was still tremendous, ranging from $4000 to over $10,000. Liz Kramer, Achieving Equitable 
Education Through the Courts: A Comparative Analysis of Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 30 
(2002).  
 36. For an explanation of the district power equalizer, see Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: 
New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 110–11 (1995); and Vandersall, 
supra note 13, at 17, 22 n.1. 
 37. Enrich, supra note 36, at 111. 
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much inequality typically fell beyond the reach of state legislative 
responses to judicial equalization orders. 
In the 1980s, concurrent with many of the second wave equality 
lawsuits, a third wave of school finance litigation took shape. Raising the 
so-called adequacy challenge, this third wave shifted its focus away from 
the inequality of per-pupil and per-school expenditures, embracing in its 
stead the argument that all children are entitled, not to an equal 
educational experience, but rather to an adequate one. Focusing on specific 
state constitutional guarantees of educational quality, litigants were able to 
point to the documented failures of many schools as evidence that children 
were receiving an inadequate education.38 Coinciding with the ascendancy 
of the call for standards and accountability in U.S. schools, adequacy 
appealed to those who sought to articulate clear expectations for school 
performance and to define assessment mechanisms for evaluating 
achievement.39
The doctrinal shift from equality to adequacy, which allowed school 
reformers to use “failure in the classroom . . . [to achieve] success in the 
courtroom,”40 can be traced to a number of forces and considerations. 
First, the sheer cost of equalizing school funding, if equalization were 
understood to mean that all schools should receive the amount spent by the 
state’s wealthiest districts, would be astronomical. In the case of Texas, 
for instance, the state Attorney General estimated that it would require an 
amount equal to four times the total state budget to bring all districts up to 
the top.41 Adequacy would be less expensive to achieve because it focuses 
not on leveling up to the top but on making sure that all public education 
meets some minimum mandated standard. Second, judicial reluctance to 
adopt the equality norm for school district funding may have reflected the 
courts’ concern that the same reasoning could be extended to cover claims 
 38. Continuing to build on the wave metaphor, Professor James Ryan has identified an incipient 
“fourth wave” of litigation that seeks desegregation of the public schools and redistricting to achieve 
integration. Ryan, Race and Money, supra note 34, at 307–10; see also Kevin Randall McMillan, 
Note, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation and the 
Courts’ Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867 (1998).  
 39. See Molly McUsic, The Law’s Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and 
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR 
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 117–19 (Jay P. Huebert ed., 1999) [hereinafter McUsic, The 
Law’s Role]; Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity and Constitutional Theory: Preliminary 
Thoughts on the Role of School Choice and the Autonomy Principle, 14 J.L. & POL. 411, 428 (1998) 
[hereinafter Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity]; Michael Heise, The Courts, Educational Policy, 
and Unintended Consequences, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 633, 634–35 (2002) [hereinafter 
Heise, Unintended Consequences]. 
 40. See Heise, Unintended Consequences, supra note 39, at 634. 
 41. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 495–96 (Tex. 1991).  
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to equality in a wide range of municipal services.42 Adequacy claims, in 
contrast, are precisely and narrowly tailored to the specific education 
clauses in state constitutions. Third, the wealthy districts’ strenuous 
opposition to any reform that sought to limit local spending is frequently 
cited as an important reason behind the shift to adequacy.43 Adequacy 
theories typically do not seek to disturb the ability of wealthy districts to 
generate funds that far exceed the revenues of the poorer districts in the 
state. Thus, adequacy does not require the decisionmakers to sacrifice 
spending on their own children’s education in order to provide others with 
educational opportunities.44 Fourth, implementation of the equality norm is 
complicated because the term itself has so many definitions45—it could 
refer to equality of funds, equality of educational services, equality of 
educational outcomes, or equality of revenue raising ability.46 Fifth, some 
 42. See Enrich, supra note 36, at 161. The United States Supreme Court suggested this concern 
in its Rodriguez opinion. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54. Several state courts have also explicitly 
recognized the same concern. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 593 (Ariz. 1973); 
Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 646–47 (Idaho 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 281 
(N.J. 1973).  
 43. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 328–29 (1991) [hereinafter McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses]; see also 
Maurice R. Dyson, Leave No Child Behind: Normative Proposals to Link Educational Adequacy 
Claims and High Stakes Assessment Due Process Challenges, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 16–17 
(2002) (noting how adequacy claims are far less threatening, and thus more acceptable, to wealthy 
school districts). One description of Kentucky school reform describes how proponents were “mindful 
of the need to reassure wealthier school districts and the public generally that they themselves were, as 
they put, it ‘anti-Robin Hood.’” Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics of Reform: Lessons 
from School Finance Litigation in Kentucky, 1984–95, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 631, 649 (2001). In 
reality, the wealthy districts have little to fear from school equalization decrees. Most have not resulted 
in legislation that takes away funds or limits taxing and spending by the state’s wealthiest districts. See 
supra text accompanying notes 13–16.  
 44. As one commentator has noted, the adequacy theory tends to “validate the values and choices 
of the decision-making elites, affirming the priority they place on quality education, by recognizing it 
as a universal good to which all children should be entitled.” Enrich, supra note 36, at 169.  
 45. Commentators frequently use the terms horizontal equity, vertical equity, and fiscal neutrality 
to describe different conceptions of equity. Horizontal equity treats all students equally, thus requiring 
equal per-pupil expenditures. Vertical equity recognizes that equality must be sensitive to the specific, 
special needs of students, and that some students will require more services. Fiscal neutrality treats 
taxpayers equally, insuring that equal taxpayer efforts will generate equal funds. See STATE EFFORTS, 
supra note 9, at 5. 
 46. See Enrich, supra note 36, at 143–55. A related argument is that some believe that adequacy 
is easier to monitor and evaluate than equality. See Helen Hershkoff, School Finance Reform and the 
Alabama Experience, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY 32 (Marilyn Gittell ed., 1998). Not all 
would agree that adequacy is an easier term for judicial implementation. See Heise, Unintended 
Consequences, supra note 39, at 633 (tracing the development of the standards movement in education 
and its incorporation by the judiciary, and concluding that courts are not well suited to define and 
monitor educational policy); James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 549 (1999) (noting how judicial definition of adequacy is idiosyncratic and 
subjective). One author has argued that in several important ways, equalization is a more manageable 
judicial norm than adequacy because it keeps the court out of the difficult inquiry about how much 
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saw adequacy as more properly reflecting the broader right of society to an 
educated citizenry, whereas equality more narrowly focused on an 
individual student’s rights.47 Finally, adequacy was often seen as a more 
attractive theoretical basis for relief for large urban districts, many of 
which actually receive more than the average per-pupil funds in their 
states yet continue to underperform.48  
Like the equality litigation it has tended to replace, the success of 
adequacy litigation in the courtroom has been mixed.49 Though both 
money must be spent on schools. Equality orders, in contrast to adequacy orders, say nothing about 
how much money is needed, but rather insist that “the same kind of decision be made for all the 
children in the state—a decision free from the influence of local wealth . . . . The core of the wrong . . . 
is not the deprivation of any particular level of education but the deprivation of a fair decision about 
the spending level.” Clune, supra note 28, at 721–32. 
 47. See Hershkoff, supra note 46, at 32.  
 48. See Heise, Unintended Consequences, supra note 39, at 648; James E. Ryan & Michael 
Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2062 (2002). In reality, the per-
pupil expenditure figures for children in large urban school districts are likely to be misleading. They 
do not take into account the fact that those school districts spend far more than average on services 
such as special education and bilingual education. New York City, for instance, spends 22% of its total 
budget on special education. See McUsic, The Law’s Role, supra note 39, at 106. A study of the 
Hartford school system found that though the city was first in the region in overall per-pupil 
expenditures, when amounts spent on special education and other special needs programs were 
excluded, the district fell to last in the region. Id. at 111. Large urban districts, with high numbers of 
poor children, suffer from many other costly deficiencies: “high mobility of students, unqualified and 
burned-out teachers, students with untreated serious health problems, developmental disabilities, 
hunger, family disruption, and violence. They often have higher security costs. Their buildings are 
usually much older than in more recently developed suburban areas . . .” Id. at 106. Thus, comparison 
of per-pupil expenditures may be a meaningless measure in the search for equality in educational 
opportunity.  
 The courts of Kansas and Wyoming, among the most firmly committed to equalization of school 
finance, make clear that equality cannot mean equal dollars per pupil. Rather, in the view of the 
Wyoming courts, a constitutional school funding formula “ . . . will be quite complex. More money 
may be needed in one school district to achieve quality education than in another because of, e.g., 
transportation costs, building maintenance costs, construction costs, logistic considerations, number of 
pupils with special problems, et cetera.” Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State (Campbell I), 907 P.2d 
1238, 1246 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 
315 n.3 (Wyo. 1980)). Similarly, the Kansas court has stated: “Obviously, educational needs, and 
concomitant costs, will vary from child to child and from place to place. The mandate is to furnish 
each child an educational opportunity equal to that made available to every other child. To do so will 
unquestionably require different expenditures at different times and places.” Montoy v. State, No. 99-
C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *10 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003). As understood by these courts, the 
equality norm applies to the educational opportunity of the state’s children, and does not require equal 
dollars per student irrespective of needs and circumstances.  
 49. Courts upholding adequacy claims include: Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. 
Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 
1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Helena 
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today 
v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); DeRolph I, 
677 N.E.2d 733; Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391. But see Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. 
Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 
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theories continue to surface in state court litigation,50 and though the 
differences between the two may be more theoretical than real,51 most 
commentators seem to agree that the adequacy approach is preferable.52 
This support sometimes comes reluctantly, as it carries with it a 
recognition that success in an adequacy lawsuit may leave in place the 
significant inequality that led to the school funding challenges in the first 
place.53 The debate about the relative merits between the two theories may 
be largely academic, however, as some studies suggest that relative 
rankings among the states have changed little, if any, irrespective of 
judicial decrees.54  
1178 (Ill. 1996); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Skeen v. State, 505 
N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995). Superimposed on the 
academic debate about the relative merits of equity and adequacy is the also unresolved debate about 
the effect of litigation. Research has yet to establish a conclusive link between the success of school 
finance litigation and the improvement of school funding in the state where the litigation was filed. 
Patricia F. First & Barbara M. De Luca, The Meaning of Educational Adequacy: The Confusion of 
DeRolph, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 185, 187 n.6 (2003); see also Bradley W. Joondeph, The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation-Prompted School Finance Reform, 35 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 763, 809 (1995) (concluding that interdistrict disparities in school funding remained 
unchanged across the nation, but were reduced somewhat in states with successful school finance 
litigation). Professor Joondeph also concluded, however, that overall education spending increases in 
those states were slower than in the rest of the country. Id. at 810. 
 50. The high courts of two neighboring states, Vermont and New Hampshire, both recently 
invalidated state school funding schemes. The holding in the Vermont case, Brigham v. State, 692 
A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997), was based most directly on an equal protection analysis, while the New 
Hampshire court, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997), relied more 
specifically on adequacy.  
 51. Notwithstanding the clear theoretical distinctions between adequacy and equality, the reality 
is somewhat less dichotomous. In fact, one commentator has shown how courts using adequacy as the 
doctrinal basis of their decision repeatedly focus on inequality as evidence of inadequacy. See Enrich, 
supra note 36, at 130–31, 133–34, 140. The convergence is not surprising. Large gaps between the top 
and the bottom are powerful images for claims of inadequacy. Similarly, inadequate school districts 
are generally poor and can point to huge funding and spending disparities with wealthy districts. See 
generally BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 8, at 417–32. Irrespective of the theory, plaintiffs in all 
of these cases seek to end the substandard, indeed shocking, conditions and outputs of the nation’s 
lowest performing schools. For example, consider the conditions described by the Ohio Supreme Court 
in DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 743–44. 
 52. McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses, supra note 43, at 307; see, e.g., McUsic, The Law’s 
Role, supra note 39, at 90–92; Enrich, supra note 36, at 166–83; Heise, Third Wave, supra note 26; 
Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate Educational Opportunity, 14 J.L. & POL. 483, 495–
501 (1998). 
 53. See Clune, supra note 28, at 728–29; Enrich, supra note 36, at 158–59. 
 54. See Michele Moser & Ross Rubenstein, The Equality of Public School District Funding in 
the United States: A National Status Report, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 63, 70 (2002). Others have 
disputed those claims, arguing that those states whose courts invalidated school funding schemes in 
fact made greater gains in terms of equity of spending. See, e.g., William N. Evans, Sheila E. Murray 
& Robert Schwab, Schoolhouses, Courthouses and Statehouses After Serrano, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 10 (1997); Joondeph, supra note 49, at 774. 
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B. Throwing Money at Wealthy Districts 
Social scientists have long debated the extent to which “money 
matters” in school reform. In the courts, that controversy has raged since 
the first school finance challenges were litigated in the 1970s.55 It 
continues unabated.56 Countless studies have reached contradictory 
conclusions. On one side, the economist Eric Hanushek is today the 
undisputed leader of those whose statistical analyses purport to establish 
that “there is no systematic relationship between school expenditures and 
student performance.”57 In the legal literature, Professor Ronald 
Ferguson’s research is frequently cited as support for the opposite claim—
that is, that spending is positively correlated with enhanced educational 
achievement.58 Another group of scholars takes the middle position that 
 55. The Supreme Court essentially gave up on trying to answer that question, concluding that the 
question whether increasing school revenue would produce enhanced educational achievement was 
“unsettled and disputed.” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23. In contrast, the New Jersey and Wyoming 
Supreme Courts asserted that the extensive disparity in school funding has a direct relationship to the 
quality of education. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 278 (N.J. 1973); Washakie, 606 P.2d at 
334. 
 56. One tally revealed that the courts of nine states explicitly concluded that school funding is 
correlated with student achievement. Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation: 
Acknowledging that Race Discrimination in Public Education is More Than Just a Tort, 96 NW. U. L. 
REV. 99, 179 n.373 (2001). Other courts have disagreed. See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 
P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982); Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 260; Morgan, supra, at 179 n.373; see also 
Heise, Unintended Consequences, supra note 39, at 656 (noting judicial willingness to assume or deny 
the correlation, notwithstanding “significant social scientific uncertainty surrounding the nature and 
contour of the relation between resources and achievement . . .”); id. at n.148 (listing some of the most 
prominent literature on both sides of that debate). 
 57. Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 423, 425 (1991). The original impetus for the huge body of research was a study published 
as the Coleman Report, named for the lead author, the sociologist James Coleman. JAMES S. 
COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966). The Coleman report concluded 
both that the amount of school funding had very little effect on student achievement, and that the two 
most important determinants of a child’s educational achievement were the family’s status and the 
socioeconomic level of the child’s classmates. For some of the numerous other studies that tend to 
concur with Hanushek, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A 
REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1972); Jonathan Klick, Do 
Dollars Make a Difference?: The Relationship Between Expenditures and Test Scores in 
Pennsylvania’s Public Schools, 44 AM. ECONOMIST 81–87 (2000). Various law review articles 
summarize the literature and the debate over the extent to which money matters. See, e.g., Lloyd 
Cohen, A Study of Invidious Racial Discrimination in Admissions at Thomas Jefferson High School for 
Science and Technology: Monty Python and Franz Kafka Meet a Probit Regression, 66 ALB. L. REV. 
447, 448 n.4 (2003); Dyson, supra note 43, at 10–11 (discussing the results of many studies that 
dispute Coleman’s and Hanushek’s claims); Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity by the 
Numbers: The Warren Court’s Empirical Legacy, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1326–28 (2002) 
[hereinafter Heise, By the Numbers]; Ryan & Heise, supra note 48, at 2102–03. 
 58. Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money 
Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 488 (1991) (concluding that students’ academic achievement can 
be shown to depend significantly on teacher achievement, teacher experience, and class size). For 
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only some types of expenditures are positively correlated with enhanced 
student achievement.59 Still others are basically agnostic on the issue, 
noting the “essential indeterminacy of the cost/quality relationship . . . .”60  
What, then, do the statistics reveal about spending in America’s school 
districts? For the most part, they confirm that wealthy school districts have 
long been partaking of a luxury spending spree. At least three observations 
are relevant. First, the spending by wealthy districts has increased 
steadily.61 Second, and notwithstanding the huge increases in state aid for 
education, the gap between wealthy and poor districts has continued 
unabated.62 Though the difference has been reduced in some of those 
states whose courts have invalidated school funding systems, on a 
nationwide basis, the range still reveals stark differences.63 In fact, 
some of the literature that concurs with Ferguson’s claims, see, for example, Matthew M. Craft, Note, 
Lost and Found: The Unequal Distribution of Local Option Sales Tax Revenue Among Iowa Schools, 
88 IOWA L. REV. 199, 211 n.99 (2002) (citing sources disputing Hanushek’s claims); Richard J. 
Murnane, Interpreting the Evidence on “Does Money Matter?,” 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 457 (1991). 
The Alabama Supreme Court explicitly accepted Professor Ferguson’s conclusion that there is a 
positive correlation between student achievement levels and certain types of expenditures. Opinion of 
the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 140 (Ala. 1993).  
 59. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Harter, How Educational Expenditures Relate to Student Achievement: 
Insights from Texas Elementary Schools, 24 J. EDUC. FIN. 281, 282 n.7 and 292–93 (1999). 
 60. Clune, supra note 28, at 727; see also Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform 
Based on Christian-Judeo Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1, 34 n.102 (2002) (describing conflicting results in 
the social science literature); Hartman, supra note 11, at 390 (describing conflicting results as 
“inconsistent and inconclusive”).  
 61. One study of Pennsylvania school district spending determined that wealthy district per-pupil 
expenditures increased from $4298 in 1984 to $8032 in 1993. Hartman, supra note 11, at 394. That 
study also noted that property value and average citizen income per student rose at faster rates for the 
high spending districts. Id. at 396. One commentator describes similar inequality in Vermont prior to 
its school funding litigation. Thomas Downes, School Finance Reform and School Quality: Lessons 
from Vermont, in HELPING CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND (John Yinger ed., forthcoming 2004). Between 
1989 and 1995, wealthy district spending increased at an annual rate of nearly 4%, while increases at 
the bottom of the range was under 2%. Id.  
 62. A federal analysis of school spending nationwide has concluded that even in states that have 
adopted statewide equalization efforts, wealthy districts frequently continue to preserve or exacerbate 
the gap. STATE EFFORTS, supra note 9, at 30–44. In fact, only those states that have capped spending 
by wealthy districts saw a substantial narrowing of the gap. Id.; see also McUsic, Law’s Role, supra 
note 39, at 88–89 (criticizing unfunded federal mandates, state and local government structures, and 
government subsidy of private schools as important forces in the preservation of school inequality). In 
fact, in some districts, the gap between wealthy and poor districts is increasing. Professor Martha 
Minow referred to a report in the popular press describing how the gap between wealthy and poor 
districts in terms of per-pupil expenditures on Long Island increased from $400 in 1982 to $1500 in 
1991. Martha Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter? 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 398 (1991).  
 63. One author notes that the gap remains, and in some cases has widened, even in states whose 
courts have ordered equalization. See Enrich, supra note 36, at 102–03 and n.6. Another concludes that 
overall intrastate equality in school funding improved slightly between 1992 and 1995. See Moser & 
Rubenstein, supra note 54, at 70. Yet another analysis of school funding patterns concluded that state 
judicial orders produced some reduction in interdistrict disparities, but that on a nationwide basis, 
interdistrict differences within a state remain significant. See Joondeph, supra note 49, at 809. The 
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increased state funds for the poorest districts may do little to reduce the 
gap between poor and wealthy districts in the absence of concurrent 
restrictions on taxing and spending by wealthy districts.64 Third, at the 
international level, the United States’ per-pupil expenditures are at the 
top,65 yet student achievement is not.66 When compared to many other 
nations, the U.S. consistently outspends and underperforms.67 In the words 
more difficult question of whether judicial equalization orders have resulted in enhanced student 
achievement is also unresolved. See Hamill, supra note 60, at nn.102, 134.  
 64. See STATE EFFORTS, supra note 9, at 6–7, 32–42. The report analyzed spending data for four 
states that changed their school finance systems by adopting state level equalization schemes. Id. Two 
of the states, Oregon and Kansas, coupled the enhancement of state revenue with limits on local ability 
to tax and spend. Id. Two of the states, Louisiana and Rhode Island, did not. Id. While the gap between 
poor and wealthy districts decreased in Kansas and Oregon, it increased in Louisiana and remained the 
same in Rhode Island. Id. 
 65. In absolute per-pupil terms, the United States ranked first among G-7 countries, spending 
$5434 per pupil, with other averages ranging from $5297 (Sweden) to $1463 (Korea). See U.S. DEPT. 
OF EDUC., NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 27–28 (2000). In 1993–94, total expenditures in U.S. elementary and 
secondary schools were estimated at $285 billion. See THREE STATES, supra note 11, at 3. At the same 
time, the U.S. school spending patterns displayed much less equality of distribution than existed in 
other countries. See id. at 41; see also Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 39, at 419 
n.37. According to one prominent commentator, per-student spending in U.S. schools has quintupled 
over each 50 year period since 1890. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK, MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING 
PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS 27 (1994); see also McUsic, The Law’s Role, supra note 
39, at 110 (noting that the U.S. spends “more than virtually all other industrialized countries both as a 
total per pupil and as a percentage of government expenditures.”); Heise, Hollow Victories, supra note 
26, at 566 (noting that the U.S. outspends almost all counterparts).  
 66. Though the performance of U.S. children in international assessments ranged from relatively 
good at the 4th grade level to below average at the 12th grade level, students in other countries 
routinely outperform their American counterparts. See U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NAT’L CENTER FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 65, at 27–28; see also Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational 
Opportunity: School Reform, Law, and Public Policy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114–18 (2001) 
(summarizing data on the performance of U.S. students on international tests and government spending 
on education). The well-publicized decline in SAT scores is also used as evidence of declining student 
achievement in the face of rising student expenditures. See Heise, Unintended Consequences, supra 
note 39, at 642. Other research is more sanguine about American student achievement. See, e.g., 
Robinson, supra note 52, at 502–03 (summarizing one international literacy study that ranked 
American students highly). In fact, recent SAT scores show modest gains, leading some to express 
guarded optimism. See Diana Jean Schemo, High School Seniors Get Highest SAT Math Scores in 35 
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at B9.  
 67. A recent report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics compared international educational spending with international 
educational performance and found, once again, that although the United States spends more per 
student than any country except Norway and Luxembourg, its student achievement levels consistently 
lag behind. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND UNESCO 
INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS, LITERACY SKILLS FOR THE WORLD OF TOMORROW—FURTHER RESULTS 
FROM PISA 2000 111–14 (2003); see also Matthew Ladner & Matthew J. Brouillette, The Impact of 
Charter Schools and Public School Choice on Public School Districts in Wayne County, Michigan, 45 
HOW. L. REV. 395, 401 & n.17 (2002) (describing international studies that confirm that other 
countries “spend much less and get much better results.”); Lewis D. Solomon, The Role of For-Profit 
Corporations in Revitalizing Public Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 883, 
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of one analyst of international educational achievement: “There are 
countries which don’t get the bang for the bucks, and the U.S. is one of 
them.”68
C. Limiting Luxury Spending in Public Schools 
The case for limiting spending by wealthy school districts does not 
depend on the resolution of the apparently interminable debate over 
whether, and if so how much, money is correlated with student 
achievement. On the one hand, if it is true that levels of funding are not 
correlated with student achievement, limiting spending at the top is smart, 
because it will either result in excess tax revenues that can be spent in 
other areas or in overall decreases in taxes with no decrease in student 
performance. Though the “money doesn’t matter” proponents typically use 
their statistical evidence to argue that it is foolish to “throw money” at 
low-performing and low-funded schools,69 the argument seems to apply 
with equal force to counsel against overspending in those schools whose 
students are garnering the highest per-pupil funds in the state. If the 
generally-accepted claim that socioeconomic background is the most 
important predictor of student performance is in fact correct,70 it may well 
be that high-spending, high-achieving districts are actually inefficient. 
That is, wealthy districts may be spending exorbitant amounts to produce 
the same outputs that would have resulted with far lower levels of 
spending.  
On the other hand, if in fact it turns out to be the case that money does 
matter, limiting spending at the top in order to spread the wealth more 
broadly across the entire state would presumably produce more widely 
distributed gains in academic achievement. If expenditures really do 
influence educational achievement, withholding money from the lowest 
performing students, who come from the poorest and least advantaged 
families and neighborhoods, is indefensible public policy and runs counter 
to the exhortations with which school finance reform originated. 
885–91 (1993) (criticizing high spending levels that produce no academic gains, and describing the 
“weak academic achievement of U.S. school children” in comparison with school children worldwide).  
 68. See Editorial, Money Can’t Buy the Best System, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 21, 2003, at A47 
(quoting Barry McGaw, education director for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, which conducted an analysis of international spending on education; the study found 
that although the U.S. spent nearly 65% more than the average of the major industrialized nations, the 
performance of its 15-year-olds on math and reading tests fell in the middle). 
 69. See cases cited at supra note 55. In all of those cases, the defendants used Hanushek’s 
research to justify their failure to spend more money in the poorest districts.  
 70. See supra note 58.  
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Unchecked school district spending means that “the quality of a child’s 
education [is] a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors.”71 For 
those who still hold to the powerful simplicity of the Supreme Court’s 
description of education in Brown v. Board of Education, as “a right which 
must be made available to all on equal terms,”72 this reality is 
unacceptable. Either way, then, reducing luxury spending on education 
would contribute to increased societal welfare.73  
The next section evaluates a number of states that have in fact adopted 
school finance reforms that seek to reduce luxury spending. Though the 
laws differ in many ways, they all reflect a legislative determination to 
rein in spending by the wealthiest school districts, either through the 
imposition of tax limits or by redistributing excess revenues generated by 
application of a uniform tax levy. The literature and the case law suggest 
several important criticisms of the principles underlying this decision to 
check spending at the top. Thus, before analyzing the various state reforms 
that have taken that unusual move, it would be helpful to consider the 
range of the objections that have surfaced. 
First, government action to limit luxury spending by public school 
districts might be challenged as inefficient, and as an unwarranted 
interference with personal freedom to spend as one chooses. According to 
the Tiebout model,74 local governments, which include school districts, 
 71. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971). The court criticized the connection 
between wealth and educational quality in a system based on property tax revenues. Id. at 1263. 
 72. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  
 73. Current school spending patterns, where wealthy districts are engaged in a race to outspend 
each other, may respond to the same incentive of relative supremacy that Professor Frank describes for 
the individual consumer. See FRANK, supra note 20. Whatever the actual correlation between student 
achievement and school funding, his model provides a clear explanation of why wealthy school 
districts are unlikely to reduce their own luxury spending voluntarily. That is, the Luxury Fever model 
explains school districts’ urge to spend, not as a function of efficiency, choice, or enhanced student 
performance, but rather in terms of the importance of their relative position. In this view, the primary 
motivator for luxury spending is the wealthy districts’ resolve to remain at the top of the school district 
pyramid. Much like a country trapped in the nuclear arms race, or consumers seeking to impress their 
peers with fancy and expensive watches, no district is willing to take the risk of decreasing spending 
unilaterally. Without an overall limit at the top, any individual district that decreases spending would 
be at a perceived relative disadvantage vis-a-vis the other districts that continued to spend at luxury 
rates. If the spending power of all districts were capped, and if excess district spending were taxed, 
heavy spending at the top would flatten out, and individual district incentives would come more in line 
with overall societal incentives. The results of a recent GAO study are consistent with this suggestion. 
In its analysis of four state legislative equalization reforms, infusions of greater state funds into lower 
spending school districts was met with an increase in spending by wealthy districts, with the result that 
the gap between rich and poor was preserved or increased. Only in the two states that also imposed a 
cap on wealthy district spending did the state equalization dollars result in meaningful equalization. 
See STATE EFFORTS, supra note 9, at 30–44.  
 74. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
For a brief summary of the doctrine and the critique it has generated, see Laurie Reynolds, 
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compete to provide a desired mix of services and to retain their 
constituents, whom Tiebout described as “consumer-voters.”75 
Competition between and among schools should produce greater 
efficiency and variety in the range and level of schools. Citizen-consumers 
will translate their preferences for, say, high spending schools, by moving 
to a jurisdiction that offers that level of service. It is just as likely, in 
theory at least, that some consumers will choose to live in a district that 
spends little on education.76 Limits on school district spending would 
eliminate that competition and the efficiency benefits it produces.  
Scholars have questioned the accuracy of the assumptions on which 
Tiebout’s theory is based77 as well as the normative acceptability of the 
world the theory would produce.78 In the context of school finance, 
though, the link between property wealth and school revenues makes the 
Tiebout theory particularly unacceptable. First, preference or choice is an 
inaccurate explanation of the reason so many children attend inadequate 
and underfunded schools. As Professor Frug has noted: “[P]eople who live 
Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 
93, 103–06 (2003). In the legal literature, the preeminent critiques of the Tiebout theory are found in 
the work of Professors Richard Briffault and Gerald Frug. See generally Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990); Gerald E. Frug, City 
Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23 (1998). 
 75. See Tiebout, supra note 74, at 419.  
 76. That phenomenon is undoubtedly part of the balance struck by the many retired citizens who 
move to communities in the sun belt where numbers of school children, and thus school taxes, are low. 
To say, however, that these citizens are exercising their choice to live in districts that spend low sums 
on schools is misleading. Retirees are not searching for school districts where they can educate their 
own children at a low cost. Rather, they are looking for ways to contribute as little as possible to the 
education of others’ children. Thus, the phenomenon suggests that older citizens without children may 
choose to live where numbers of children are low, not that families with children choose low spending 
school districts because they prefer low spending schools. Low spending school districts are frequently 
correlated with low housing prices and with higher levels of community disorder. See generally 
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001) (showing correlation 
with low-cost housing); Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 644–50 (2002) (book 
review) (showing correlation with community disorder). These facts cast further doubt on the Tiebout 
model’s accuracy when applied to schools and consumer-voter choice. 
 77. Professor William Fischel has noted that if Tiebout were correct in his claim that consumers 
choose their homes in accordance with the services they prefer to receive, we would expect the school 
districts with expensive good schools to be populated predominantly by families with children. Since 
that is not the case, Fischel suggests that the choice of a home in a high-spending school district is 
more of an investment decision than a consumption decision. See FISCHEL, supra note 76, at 148–62. 
In her review of Professor Fischel’s book, Professor Lee Fennell criticized the normative underpinning 
of the Fischel model, as it results in economic segregation as well as the imposition of negative 
externalities, in the form of concentrated poverty in other less wealthy areas. See Fennell, supra note 
76, at 642–45, 649–54; see also Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824 
(2003). 
 78. For a summary of those arguments, see Reynolds, supra note 74, at 105–06.  
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in unsafe neighborhoods or send their children to inadequate schools don’t 
do so because they have taste for them . . . . If they had a choice . . ., they 
would prefer better schools and less crime.”79 More fundamentally, 
perhaps, preference and choice seem inappropriate when used to describe 
the government’s responsibility under state constitutional protections of 
public education. Constitutional guarantees, whatever their ultimate scope, 
surely must be more than mere restatements of market principles. Finally, 
if the benefit of a universally high quality education redounds to society as 
a whole, it is not immediately apparent that parents should have the 
“choice” to provide their children with an inadequate education.80 In 
essence, the defense of luxury spending in school districts as an important 
element of individual choice and preference translates directly into the 
claim that citizens are entitled to “get what they pay for” in the receipt of a 
constitutionally guaranteed public service and, in turn, that it is acceptable 
to allocate public education dollars on the basis of wealth.81  
Second, those who oppose limits on school district revenue raising 
point to pragmatic considerations: any proposal to cap spending, they 
argue, will produce fierce and insurmountable public opposition.82 Though 
that is certainly the common wisdom, several facts cast doubt on the extent 
to which it is an overpowering force. As parents with school children 
become ever smaller percentages of the population,83 and as aging 
 79. See Frug, supra note 74, at 31.  
 80. Other commentators have described state discomfort with district power equalizer formulas 
that in essence leave the local districts with the decision whether to use state funds to reduce overall 
education spending and local tax levels, thus facilitating a shift from “low spending because of low 
wealth to low spending because of low tax politics.” See Clune, supra note 28, at 728. For an analysis 
of the phenomenon in Michigan’s school funding reform, see Michael F. Addonizio, Lyndon G. Furst 
& John Dayton, Blowing Up the System: Some Fiscal and Legal Perspectives on Michigan’s School 
Finance Reform, 107 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 16–17 (1996); see also W. Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. 
Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 579 (Tex. 2003) (noting that the legislature is “constitutionally bound” to 
“deprive[] school districts of any meaningful discretion to provide an inadequate education . . .”); 
McGowan v. State, 60 P.3d 67, 70 (Wash. 2002) (emphasizing that the state’s obligation to fund 
education means that it cannot make educational quality dependent on the choice of the voters). 
 81. For a general critique of that model of local government, see Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, 
Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 
373 (2004).  
 82. See Enrich, supra note 36, at 155–59; see also Augenblick, supra note 17, at 92, 98 (noting 
how wealthy districts in Kansas discussed secession from the state in response to threats to their 
spending levels); Robinson, supra note 52, at 515 (describing efforts to redistribute property tax from 
wealthy districts as “doomed to ultimate failure”). In the words of noted school funding commentators, 
“[l]ocal citizens, and especially parents, do not like to be told that they cannot raise and spend local 
revenues on their own schools.” Ryan & Heise, supra note 48, at 2060. Another commentator 
describes spending caps as “the worst single problem besetting school finance litigation.” Clune, supra 
note 28, at 739.  
 83. The average age in the United States is increasing, and the numbers of families with school-
aged children is decreasing. Erin E. Buzuvis, Note, “A” for Effort: Evaluating Recent State Education 
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homeowners without children become less sympathetic to frequent calls 
for more money for schools,84 the image of the politically all-powerful 
pro-school contingent may need updating.85 Moreover, the number of 
districts that would be adversely affected by limits on spiraling increases is 
by definition very small. School finance reform in Vermont, for example, 
which capped luxury spending for the richest districts and resulted in 
greater state funding of education, produced lower property tax bills for 
89% of Vermont’s taxpayers.86 In terms of sheer political strategy, then, 
capping school district spending may be less problematic than is 
commonly thought.87  
Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 686 
(2001). For instance, in the late 1970s in California, parents with children in school made up 42% of 
the electorate; by 1998, that figure had decreased to 21%. PETER SHRAG, PARADISE LOST: 
CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA’S FUTURE 125 (1998). One analysis of the 2000 Census data 
concluded that households with children constitute a declining percentage of overall U.S. population. 
In 2000, less than 25% of all households fell into the “married with children” category, compared with 
approximately 40% in 1970. Considering total households with children, whether the adults are 
married or not, the percentage rises to just under 33%. William H. Frey & Alan Berube, City Families 
and Suburban Singles. An Emerging Household Story, in REDEFINING URBAN & SUBURBAN 
AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, at 257, 260–63 (Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds., 2003); 
see also Robinson, supra note 52, at 508 n.85 (pointing to changing demographics as a key factor in 
decline of public support of education). These phenomena are likely to reduce local enthusiasm for 
luxury spending on public schools.  
 84. A GAO study noted increasing voter resistance to local school district referenda to raise 
school taxes. See THREE STATES, supra note 11, at 45, 53–54; see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King 
County v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 78, 101–02 (Wash. 1978) (describing repeated failed referendum 
attempts and noting that during the 1975–76 school year, 40% of the state’s students lived in districts 
where bond levies had failed).  
 85. See STATE EFFORTS, supra note 11, at 14, 54–55 (reporting district difficulties in procuring 
passage of school bond referenda); Robinson, supra note 52, at 509 (noting decreasing popular support 
of property tax). 
 86. See Michael A. Rebell & Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response, Radical Reform: The Story of 
School Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 167, 182 (2002).  
 87. It would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the disproportionate power of wealthy 
school districts and communities. In an analysis of regional demographics and politics in major 
metropolitan areas, Myron Orfield has found a remarkably similar distribution of population and 
wealth: 20–40% live in central cities; 25–30% in older declining suburbs; 10–15% in low tax base 
suburbs; and the remainder, the favored quarter, in high tax base, wealthy suburbs. Myron Orfield, 
Conflict or Consensus? Forty Years of Minnesota Metropolitan Politics, 16 BROOKINGS REV. 31, 34 
(1998). Orfield urged the formation of seemingly natural political alliances between central city and 
older suburbs, many of which face similar problems with aging infrastructure, high social service 
needs, increasing poverty and declining tax base. MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL 
AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (rev. ed. 1997). In practice, however, notwithstanding their 
shared problems, alliances between central cities and older suburbs have proved difficult to create and 
sustain, which may be due, in part at least, to the disproportionate power of the wealthy local 
governments in a region. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the 
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1987 (2000) 
(noting how the favored quarter has been able to “capture the largest share of the region’s public 
infrastructure investments and job growth”). 
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Third, some fear that limiting luxury spending by school districts will 
produce a mass exodus of children to private schools.88 Because of the 
generally accepted claim that the peer group is of substantial importance in 
predicting educational achievement,89 loss of large numbers of more 
affluent children would have a negative impact on public school quality 
and on the educational achievement of those left behind.90 The novelist 
John Irving is perhaps the most famous “bail out parent” in this 
controversy. Soon after Vermont restructured its school finance system to 
limit the upward spiral of heavy spending at the top, Irving denounced the 
reforms as “Marxist,” removed his child from the local public schools, and 
established a private school himself.91 Whether the threat of flight to 
private schools is a real concern, of course, depends on how many families 
will assume the financial burden of private school tuition while continuing 
to pay their local school taxes. One study suggests that the likelihood of 
massive defection is extremely small. It documents how the much feared 
flight to private schools in California simply did not materialize in the 
wake of Proposition XII, the radical property tax revolt of the 1970s.92 
Even though California school spending plummeted from one of the top 
spending states to thirty-fifth over the course of a few short years,93 private 
school enrollment rose only slightly.94
 88. See, e.g., Joondeph, supra note 49, at 819, n.235; Schomberg, supra note 11, at 168.  
 89. In spite of the strident disagreement surrounding funding and its impact on student 
achievement, one of the Coleman Report’s findings has enjoyed widespread support: “[T]he social 
composition of the student body is more highly related to achievement, independently of the student’s 
own social background, than is any school factor . . . .” COLEMAN, supra note 57, at 325. In a recent 
article, Professor Michael Heise described the “remarkable consensus [that] has formed on the point 
that the socioeconomic status of one’s peers matters a great deal.” See Heise, By the Numbers, supra 
note 57, at 1327.  
 90. Professor Clayton Gillette, who generally supports the application of market principles to the 
provision of government services, has recognized that exercise of individual choice to defect from 
public schools could have serious negative societal impacts. See Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of 
Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185, 1213–14 (1996). 
 91. See Rebell & Metzler, supra note 86, at 183; Robinson, supra note 52, at 516 n.112. 
 92. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.  
 93. See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 
465 (1999). One author places California even lower, stating that it fell from one of the top ten to 
forty-first in 1995–96. See SCHRAG, supra note 83, at 66, 67. For another unflattering assessment of 
California school spending and achievement, see McUsic, The Law’s Rule, supra note 39, at 112 
(noting that California school funding dropped to forty-sixth in terms of percentage of income spent on 
education, and that student reading proficiency performance fell to forty-ninth, with only Mississippi 
beneath it).  
 94. Between 1973 and 1993, private school enrollment increased 1% in California, while it 
increased 2% on a national level. Liz Kramer, Achieving Equitable Education Through the Courts: A 
Comparative Analysis of Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 49 (2002). Although bailout from public to 
private schools may not be a real threat, the bailout phenomenon has been at work in American 
society, but in a different context—post World War II suburbanization, which emptied most major 
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A fourth objection to capping luxury spending raises the “dumbing 
down” concern—that reducing spending at the top will only serve to 
reduce the quality of schools at the top, with no corresponding gain at 
other levels across the state.95 Merely lowering spending on one group of 
children, the argument goes, does nothing by itself to enhance the 
educational opportunities available to disadvantaged children.96 Of course, 
if Hanushek is right about the connection between school finance and 
student achievement, decreasing spending in the wealthiest districts, 
whose children are typically from affluent families, is not likely to 
translate into a real decline in achievement. If he is not, and if money spent 
is in fact an important predictor of academic success, the “dumbing down” 
argument can be criticized as resting squarely on an unstated claim of 
entitlement to an uneven playing field. Though many concerned, well-
meaning parents and citizens are unlikely to think of their devotion to 
public school spending in these terms, opposition to spending limits may 
simply seek to preserve the ability of wealthy school districts to provide an 
educational experience well beyond what is available in less affluent and 
poor districts. With that enhanced experience, presumably, comes 
enhanced achievement. One commentator described this possible motive 
by noting that parents in wealthy districts “don’t want their children to 
have to compete on even terms, although they are generally too savvy to 
cities of their middle classes. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985). As mainly white, affluent families left cities in 
droves for the suburbs, large urban school districts lost virtually all of their middle and upper middle 
class students. The homogeneous schools wealthy suburbanites now fund with their property taxes 
have been untouched by the decline and lack of achievement that characterize urban school districts. 
Had city parents not been able to translate their suburban property wealth into captured tax revenues 
for their own highly funded schools, it is not unreasonable to speculate that some of the urban flight 
might not have happened.  
 95. For example, in Edgewood IV, the court noted its opposition to absolute equality of school 
spending: “The effect of this ‘equity at all levels’ theory of efficiency is to ‘level-down’ the quality of 
our public school system, a consequence which is universally regarded as undesirable from an 
educational perspective.” 917 S.W.2d at 730. It may be true that equalization sometimes produces total 
overall decreases in school spending. For example, when California equalized school funding across 
the state, its total education spending dropped dramatically. State per-pupil expenditures, which had 
ranked fifth in the nation in 1964–65, fell to forty-second in 1992–93. See Michael A. Rebell & Robert 
L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 157 n.229 (1996). The extent to which court-mandated school finance 
reforms produced the drop in overall education spending, because of the way in which it limited local 
school districts’ ability to generate money for local schools, is hotly debated. Dartmouth University 
economist William Fischel contends that the relationship is one of causation, while a recent article 
disputes that claim. Compare Fischel, supra note 76, with Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and 
Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 801 (2003). Another study 
found a negative correlation between judicial equalization orders and the overall rate of school funding 
increases. See Joondeph, supra note 49, at 810–17.  
 96. See Clune, supra note 28, at 739.  
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say so.”97 Martha Minow made the same point somewhat more gently, 
when she noted the inherent tension in school funding debates “between 
two competing ethics: the ethic of neutrality that is supposed to guide 
governmental action, and the ethic of preferring your own that is permitted 
to guide family behavior.”98 In either version, the phenomenon is the 
same—the goal of the unchecked spending at the top is to achieve 
performance that surpasses that of those whose schools do not have similar 
resources.  
Finally, proponents of uncapped school tax and spending powers 
contend that schools at the top exert pressure on legislatures to raise the 
bottom—the rising tide theory as applied to schools, so to speak.99 
Removing the ability to raise funds at the top, the argument goes, reduces 
the extent to which the top schools will continue to pull up the bottom. In 
reality, though, the typical school finance scheme produces exactly the 
opposite incentive. So long as the schools at the top are able to generate 
high levels of locally-raised and locally-spent tax revenues for their 
schools, their fate is disconnected from the fate of the state’s poorest 
school districts. If the wealthy districts are content with their own largely 
self-funded luxury schools, they are less likely to impose much pressure 
on their state legislature to improve the condition of poor districts in the 
state.100 The rising tide argument, in fact, appears to be more applicable in 
exactly those circumstances in which the top has been capped. If the only 
way spending on schools can rise is if it rises for everyone, the incentive is 
for the top districts to agitate for higher school spending for all schools.101 
 97. Enrich, supra note 36, at 158. The author also observed:  
[E]qualization of educational opportunity threatens the wealthy districts’ ability to give their 
children an advantage in the competition for post-school opportunities . . . . To parents who 
prize their own economic and social success and who care passionately about their children’s 
futures, preserving their schools’ superiority, and not merely their excellence, is of vital 
importance. 
See id. 
 98. Minow, supra note 62, at 397. The Supreme Court has identified the same inherent tension: 
“The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two 
forces: the desire by members of society to have educational opportunity for all children, and the 
desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its own children.” Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. at 49 (quoting J. Coleman, Foreward to G. STRAYER & R. HAIG, THE FINANCING OF EDUCATION 
IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1923)).  
 99. See Clune, supra note 28, at 739. 
 100. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAKING MONEY MATTER: FINANCING 
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 256 (Helen F. Ladd & Janet S. Hansen eds., 1999); Schomberg, supra note 11, 
162–63 (noting that limits on wealthy districts would “bring education to the forefront of the political 
dialogue.”).  
 101. Professor James Ryan made the same point when he observed that the adequacy movement, 
by disconnecting the fate of wealthy districts from that of their poorer counterparts in less affluent 
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More fundamentally, however, the long-standing and firmly entrenched 
gap between rich and poor districts suggests that the rising tide is simply 
not a real phenomenon. The gaps between wealthy and poor, to the 
perhaps disappointing extent they have been reduced, have been reduced 
by litigation102 or by greater tax efforts at the bottom,103 not by pressure 
from the wealthy districts to raise revenues for poor school districts.  
III. STATE EFFORTS TO LIMIT SCHOOL SPENDING 
For the most part, the problem of school district luxury spending 
appears to have escaped the attention of state legislatures. Scattered across 
the country, though, and embedded in at times hopelessly complex and 
convoluted funding schemes, are a few examples of state legislative limits 
on the taxing and spending options of wealthy districts. In some instances, 
the cap on spending at the top is implemented as part of a fundamental 
shift from local to state funding of education.104 In others, the state has 
attempted to disconnect property wealth and school dollars without 
altering the basic local property tax scheme.105 Each of the states described 
in this section, using either a cap, a recapture plan, or a combination of the 
two, is unique in its details and responsive to its own historical 
particularities. Yet by taking steps to cap spending at the top, the state 
statutes described here have all distinguished themselves from the 
overwhelming majority of school finance laws, where school districts can 
generate as much money for local schools as the taxpayers will authorize.  
parts of the state, removes a powerful incentive for school improvement for all children. In his words, 
“the best way to ensure fair treatment of a minority group is to align that group with the majority in 
such a way that the majority cannot help or hurt itself without doing the same to the minority group.” 
See Ryan, Race and Money, supra note 34, at 271.  
 In contrast, one commentator has argued that when local revenue is redistributed from wealthy to 
poor districts, those wealthy districts lose their incentive to support public education. In that view, 
when the “connection between the burden of taxation and the benefit of better local schools is more 
attenuated . . . [a]ffluent communities will . . . be less responsive to the needs of public education . . . .” 
Joondeph, supra note 49, at 815. To the extent that citizens view public education as a private good, 
one that provides a primary benefit to one’s own children, this argument may be persuasive. According 
to a recent survey, however, most Americans now believe that strengthening public education is the 
country’s top priority, and that support extends to the belief that all children should go to schools with 
high standards and highly qualified teachers. See Wendy D. Puriefoy, Education: America’s No. 1 
Priority, in STATE LEGISLATURES, Sept. 2003, at 18. 
 102. See Evans, Murray & Schwab, supra note 54, at 10 (spending increased more and gaps were 
reduced more in those states whose funding statutes had been declared unconstitutional).  
 103. A recent GAO study concludes that “the larger tax effort of poor districts compared with that 
of wealthy districts contributed more to reducing funding gaps than did state equalization efforts in 
school year 1991–92.” STATE EFFORTS, supra note 9, at 5. 
 104. See the discussion of Washington’s statute, infra text accompanying notes 128–45. 
 105. See the discussion of Colorado’s statute, infra text accompanying notes 109–27. 
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Whatever the difficulties encountered by those states that have 
attempted to curb the spending of wealthy school districts, their decision 
to impose a cap reflects at least some commitment to the belief that the 
value of real property located within a school district’s boundaries should 
not determine the quality of the education of that district’s children. 
Moreover, their decisions to impose a limit on school districts’ taxing and 
spending powers implicitly assumes, though again to varying degrees, that 
increases in spending by the wealthiest districts are destructive of the 
overall welfare of the state school system.106 This Article excises that one 
 106. In his analysis of the private consumer market, Professor Frank described the phenomenon as 
“smart for one, dumb for all.” FRANK, supra note 20, at 146–58. This is shorthand for Frank’s 
argument that in many consumption decisions, individual incentives directly conflict with societal 
incentives. Choices that would maximize overall welfare if undertaken by all of society are actually 
not in the consumer’s best interest at the level of individual choice. For example, a consumer’s 
decision to buy a sport utility vehicle is bad for society overall, because its larger size and greater 
power will increase the chances that others will die in a traffic accident, and because it will also raise 
the amount of total air pollution. A decision to forego the SUV, however, is bad for the individual: it 
will in fact make it more likely that the consumer, driving a smaller car, will be the victim of another’s 
SUV purchase. Moreover, in terms of reducing pollution, the environmental impact of one less SUV 
on the road is meaningless. If everyone stopped buying SUVs, the relative safety advantage of having 
one would dissipate and the contribution to cleaner air would be significant. Of course, an individual 
can control only her own decisions and not those of others. See id. at 9. The well known tragedy of the 
commons comes from the same “smart for one, dumb for all” phenomenon. As described by Garrett 
Hardin, overharvesting is a rational response to dwindling resources. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of 
the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243–48 (1968). In the absence of effective policing of individual 
behavior, no one user of natural resources (such as lumber, fish, pasture lands, etc.) has an incentive to 
reduce consumption, even though continued overuse will inevitably deplete the resource. FRANK, 
supra note 20, at 157, 237. 
 Several of Frank’s other examples of the “smart for one, dumb for all” phenomenon touch on 
education. Many families with children, for instance, will spend as much as possible to buy a home in 
a good school district. As the bidding war increases housing prices, everyone ends up spending more 
for housing and “students end up at the same schools they would have attended if all families had 
spent less.” Id. at 159. No one family can refuse to participate in the competition, but overall societal 
welfare is decreased when families save less and spend more on housing. Similarly, consider the many 
test preparation courses routinely offered to high school students at a cost of several thousand dollars 
each. Again, no single family will dare to be the one to forego the test prep, because it may reduce a 
child’s chances of admission to an elite university. Yet if no one took the course, the number of 
students educated at those universities would remain constant. See id. at 155. Frank describes this 
phenomenon as the “ineluctable mathematical logic of musical chairs,” which assures that the absolute 
number of children in the top ten percent, or the number of homes in the most expensive 
neighborhoods, will remain constant. Id. at 270. Only the price that people are willing to pay for those 
spots is subject to competitive bidding. Id. These and other examples led Frank to suggest a simple 
solution as the most efficient way to close the gap between individual and societal incentives.  
 Rejecting governmental regulation and/or prohibition of luxury spending as inevitably destined to 
fail. Frank proposed a consumption tax that would be sufficiently progressive to establish meaningful 
restraints on the rate of luxury consumption. FRANK, supra note 20, at 199–201. A simple one line 
amendment to the tax laws would categorize all income as either saved (and not taxed) or spent (and 
taxed at a steeply graduated rate). Id. at 211–19. Frank argues that among the many positive societal 
changes this tax would produce, the most fundamental would be the incentive it would create for 
individuals to forego increased monetary income and to pursue alternative forms of spending. Id. at 
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feature from school district funding formulas and concentrates exclusively 
on the cap or other spending limit. With that narrow focus, however, the 
analysis may inaccurately suggest that a state’s school funding system can 
be intelligently deconstructed into its discrete components and then easily 
analyzed as a consistent whole. In fact, most school finance formulas are a 
hopelessly complex and sometimes seemingly irrational compilation of 
statutory provisions whose impact and import are not apparent to the 
naked eye, but rather require a longitudinal appreciation of the history of 
the state’s legislative battles and its judicial orders.107 The goal here, 
however, is not to provide a detailed economic and financial analysis of 
any of the schemes examined. It is, rather, to suggest some broad, 
generalizing insights about the impact of the taxing and spending powers 
of wealthy districts on school finance generally. The analysis will also 
provide a basis for suggesting whether school finance reform efforts are on 
the right track and if they are likely to produce the equalization many of 
them seek. Thus, it should provide guidance for any state that has either 
adopted or contemplated similar caps or recapture plans, suggesting which 
techniques are more likely to produce positive results and why some have 
failed in their attempts to limit luxury spending by wealthy school 
districts.  
277. Alternatives, in his view, would tend toward “less-conspicuous forms of consumption.” Id. at 
235. Such rewards consist of well-being that is not captured by the standard monetary calculation of 
income. Examples include working less to enjoy more leisure time or choosing to pursue a meaningful 
career whose income value may be lower than those that provide high market incentives. Id. at 235–
39. In addition, Frank notes that the consumption tax revenues could be used to enhance overall 
societal welfare by providing well-paid public employment. FRANK, supra note 20, at 261–65. As a 
matter of economic policy, Frank argues that income inequality is negatively correlated with economic 
growth. Well-paid public employment would tend to reduce the current gap in income between rich 
and poor. Id. at 243–45. He also supports increased spending on public improvements that would 
enhance the quality of life for society as a whole. Id. at 53–54. Frank includes several examples: 
cleaner and safer water, air, and food; better infrastructure, including higher pay for teachers; and 
social programs such as drug treatment. Id. at 54–63. 
 In essence, Frank concludes, the current trajectory, in which today’s top of the line $20,000 watch 
is inevitably destined to be tomorrow’s mid-priced model, is simply indefensible as a matter of public 
policy. Id. at 276. Frank questions how we can defend the societal choice to leave luxury spending 
unchecked, while our infrastructure deteriorates, our environment becomes more contaminated, and 
our poorest children remain uneducated? See FRANK, supra note 20, at 276–77. The decision to rein in 
Luxury Fever with a steep consumption tax, he claims, would produce important societal 
improvements: it would lower the absolute level of luxury spending; it would provide meaningful 
choices for the individual citizen about spending and consumption that are unavailable when Luxury 
Fever remains untaxed; and it would also produce government revenues that could be spent in ways 
that would truly enhance our quality of life. For this Article’s proposal to create a similar luxury tax 
for wealthy school district spending, see infra discussion at text accompanying notes 308–17. 
 107. See, e.g., Jeffrey Metzler, Inequitable Equilibrium: School Finance in the United States, 36 
IND. L. REV. 561, 583–84, 591 (2003). The Texas Supreme Court made a similar observation about the 
Texas legislature’s responses to its judicial orders. See infra note 158.  
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A. Revenue Caps 
In Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education,108 the Colorado 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state’s property tax-
based school finance system, rejecting equality challenges along the lines 
described in Section II.109 Notwithstanding the absence of a judicial 
mandate, the Colorado legislature’s adoption of the Public School Finance 
Act of 1994110 implemented fundamental changes in school funding 
formulas and declared that “a thorough and uniform system requires that 
all school districts operate under the same finance formula.”111 The 
statute’s legislative declarations also emphasized that “equity 
considerations dictate that all districts be subject to the expenditure and 
maximum levy provisions [of the statute].”112 Both statements express 
legislative adherence to the equality norm and appear to reject unrestricted 
local spending. In fact, the resulting statutory scheme does impose some 
limits on spending at the top. At the same time, though, the law leaves in 
place substantial wealth-based inequality in the generation of tax revenues 
and allows districts to tax themselves to generate additional revenues. In 
spite of the caps, then, district property wealth remains extremely relevant 
to Colorado school finance.  
Colorado’s school funding scheme establishes a formula for calculating 
the revenues to which each district is entitled, called the district’s Total 
Program, which “represents the financial base of support for public 
education in that district.”113 The amount of each district’s Total Program 
is dependent upon the number and level of students in the district, with 
adjustments made for cost of living differentials, personnel cost factors, 
numbers of at-risk students, and the size of the district.114 The calculation 
is done without reference to the local district’s property tax wealth and 
depends solely on the needs of the district as determined by statutorily 
mandated computations of total district need.115  
Funding the Total Program depends on local and state taxation, 
however, and it is at this point that the property wealth of the district 
becomes significant. First, each school district is required to levy a 
 108. 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982). 
 109. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 26–54.  
 110. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-54-101 et seq. (1998).  
 111. § 22-54-102. 
 112. Id.  
 113. § 22-54-104(1). 
 114. § 22-54-104(2)-(4). 
 115. § 22-54-104(3). 
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property tax, which must be the smallest of the following three measures: 
(1) the rate levied in the prior year; (2) the rate necessary to fund the 
district’s Total Program;116 or (3) the maximum rate allowed by the state 
constitutional tax caps, referred to as TABOR.117 The amount generated by 
the applicable property tax levy is referred to as the district’s local 
share.118 If the local levy is not sufficient to generate the revenue 
determined to be required for the district’s Total Program, the state will 
make up the difference.119 Because the state does not impose an equalized 
tax rate on all school districts, though, districts with higher levels of 
property value will be able to fund their Total Program at a lower rate than 
poorer districts. Thus, although the calculation of per-pupil funding may 
be freed from the strictures of a district’s property wealth, the actual levy 
reinstates the importance of the property wealth that the establishment of 
the Total Program apparently intended to eliminate. Since state law 
dictates only the maximum amount of local property tax revenue, but 
leaves it up to local property tax wealth to generate the revenues, 
substantial inequalities in tax rates across the state are inevitable.  
Three important aspects of Colorado law also work against the 
equalizing thrust of the Total Program. First, voters of a district may 
approve an override property tax to generate an amount equaling up to 
20% of its Total Program.120 Second, because the Total Program only 
provides minimal funding for capital construction,121 and because voters 
may authorize the issuance of bonds for capital expenditures that are 
payable out of property tax revenues,122 higher property wealth provides a 
 116. § 22-54-104(2)(a)(I).  
 117. The Taxpayers Bill of Rights, codified in Article X, Section 20, of the Colorado Constitution 
was adopted by initiative in the 1992 general election. It requires voter approval of “any new tax, tax 
rate increase . . . or extension of an expiring tax . . .” COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4). It is important to 
distinguish general property tax caps, such as TABOR and California’s well-known Proposition XIII, 
CAL. CONST. art. 13A, from this Article’s focus on state school finance statutes that independently 
impose limits on spending and revenue raising by wealthy school districts. Although tax caps such as 
TABOR and Proposition XIII have profound implications on school finance, they are beyond the 
scope of this discussion. See PAUL M. GOLDFINGER, REVENUES AND LIMITS: A GUIDE TO SCHOOL 
FINANCE IN CALIFORNIA 4–11 (2000). 
 118. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-54-106(2)(a) (1998).  
 119. § 22-54-106(4)(b). It is not clear that the state has always lived up to its funding obligations. 
See, e.g., Denver Assoc. of Ed. Office Pers. v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 972 P.2d 1047, 1049 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2000).  
 120. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-54-108 (1998). 
 121. Districts must budget an amount for capital-related expenditures. § 22-45-103(c). Although 
some state funds are available, see, e.g., § 22-54-117 (grants available for capital construction), school 
districts may issue bonds for school construction upon voter approval. § 22-42-102.  
 122. § 22-42-102.  
Washington University Open Scholarship













second major advantage.123 Finally, the state’s hold-harmless provisions 
institutionalize pre-existing inequalities by allowing local levy overrides to 
generate the funds necessary to produce the pre-caps local levy.124 Over 
the years, of course, districts with lower levies will gradually rise to the 
level of the districts with pre-caps high levies whose tax rates have 
remained unchanged. Nevertheless, hold-harmless provisions soften the 
blow of equalization for wealthy districts and may, in fact, stem the 
political uproar until the next economic crisis or successful lawsuit. Taken 
together, these options mean that communities with high levels of property 
wealth and/or growth have several options available for raising additional 
school funds that are realistically not available to poorer districts, whose 
needs for operations and construction funds may be just as pressing. 
The Colorado Department of Education’s explanation of school tax 
levies stresses the total local retention of property tax revenues: “[N]o 
district’s property tax revenues are transferred to any other districts; 
instead, moneys raised remain in the district which imposes the tax.”125 
Although the local capture of locally generated property taxes may make 
the levy limits more politically palatable, it has a regressive effect on the 
state’s school funding. That is, though all districts’ Total Programs are 
computed without reference to the districts’ wealth, the generation of the 
local share will be substantially less painful for districts with high amounts 
of property wealth. Similarly, the feasibility of additional “override 
revenues” and of local approval of additional property tax levies to pay for 
school construction is greater in districts with higher assessed valuation, 
not only because the districts have greater wealth but also because their 
Total Program is likely to have been generated by a lower property tax rate 
than the one applied by poorer districts to generate the same amount. 
Thus, as the property value in the district goes up, more revenue can be 
generated at lower rates.  
Although Colorado has been described as “among the very few states 
that place limits on how much revenue school districts can choose to raise 
 123. For communities with rapid growth rates, school construction has been a particular problem. 
Although the Colorado Supreme Court has invalidated the use of school impact fees levied on 
developers to finance the cost of new school building, at least one community has negotiated with 
developers for voluntary contributions for school construction. See Bd. of County Comm’rs of 
Douglas County v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1997); see also William P. Ankele, Jr., 
Funding Schools Through Public-Private Partnerships, 30 COLO. LAW. 75 (2001). 
 124. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-54-108 (1998); see also COLO. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
UNDERSTANDING COLORADO SCHOOL FINANCE AND CATEGORICAL PROGRAM FUNDING 7 (2003) 
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING COLORADO SCHOOL FINANCE] (describing how a “hold-harmless” 
district may obtain override revenues).  
 125. Id. at 6.  
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on their own,”126 the equalizing effect of its caps is severely undercut by 
the various wealth-based exceptions described above. In essence, the 
Colorado system potentially leaves substantial amounts of untapped 
wealth; for a property-wealthy district, the levy needed to generate the 
state-capped amount will be lower than the rate a property-poor district 
must levy. This inequality in tax rates potentially exacerbates the anti-
equalizing impact of the local option overrides. That is, wealthy districts 
whose Total Program is funded at a lower property tax levy than districts 
with less wealth are more likely to be able to resort to that untapped 
property wealth to fund local budget overrides and local authorization of 
capital bonds. All in all, the caps leave substantial unequalized property 
wealth, produce lower levy rates for property rich districts, and authorize 
districts to generate fairly substantial amounts of extra funding if voters 
approve additional property tax levies.127
Although the Colorado legislature’s statutory declarations appear to 
embrace the goal of eliminating the inequality that comes from disparities 
in local property wealth, its actual implementation of the goal falls well 
short of the mark. In reality, because the caps are imposed on the state’s 
pre-existing wealth disparity among districts, they preserve much of the 
inequality they set out to eliminate. Moreover, the exceptions to the caps 
push to increase the gap with no offsetting redistribution from wealthy to 
poor. All in all, Colorado’s system of caps is unlikely to produce a 
financing scheme consistent with the legislature’s stated goals of school 
district financial equality.  
B. Levy Caps 
In contrast to Colorado’s caps, which impose revenue limits without 
interfering with the local tax rate used to generate the funds, Washington’s 
funding statute imposes both revenue limits and a mandatory property tax 
levy. This means that whereas in Colorado, high property value translates 
into lower property tax rates, in Washington, all school districts are 
 126. See John Augenblick, The Role of State Legislatures in School Finance Reform: Looking 
Backward and Looking Ahead, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY 89, 93 (Marilyn Gittel ed., 1998).  
 127. As of 2003, school districts’ per pupil expenditures ranged between $5,511 to $12,622, with 
a statewide average of $5,930. See UNDERSTANDING COLORADO SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 124, at 
4. Given the way in which the Colorado statute adjusts per-pupil expenditures to reflect factors such as 
the district’s at-risk population, and its cost of living, that range could reflect one of two scenarios: 
continued disparities between rich and poor districts; or equalized spending that has been adjusted to 
reflect different needs among districts and their students. The caps’ anti-equalizing forces described in 
the text may make it extremely unlikely that the gap reflects a redistribution based on student and 
district need.  
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required to tax at a uniform rate. Moreover, and again in distinction to 
Colorado, Washington districts whose levy generates funds in excess of 
the amount to which they are entitled under the state funding formula are 
required to turn those revenues over to the state for redistribution to poorer 
districts.128  
In a 1978 opinion, Seattle School District v. State (commonly referred 
to as the Doran opinion after the trial judge who wrote the first order),129 
Washington’s highest court found that the state’s school funding scheme 
violated its constitution’s education clause. Pursuant to statutory overhaul, 
the state assumed responsibility for approximately 75% of school district 
general fund revenue.130 State revenues are generated from a variety of 
taxes, but a statewide property tax levy is one of the sources.131 That levy 
constitutes approximately 13% of the total state contribution; the 
remainder is made up by sales tax (which constitutes more than half of the 
total amount spent by the state on education) and other revenues.132  
As in Colorado, Washington school districts may appeal to the voter 
for an override; with a 60% majority requirement, voters may approve 
raises in the so-called “levy lids” in an aggregate amount that does not 
exceed 24% of the previous year’s total state and federal funding.133 Since 
the local levies are based on local property wealth, wide variation in 
community tax bases guarantees that levies will produce vastly differing 
amounts.134 The state of Washington does provide some incentive for 
poorer districts to pass local levies. This funding is labeled “local effort 
 128. The California legislature implemented a cap system similar to Washington’s in response to 
its supreme court’s invalidation of the state funding scheme in Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1214 (Cal. 
1971), but the voters’ adoption of a constitutional property tax cap preempted that legislative reform. 
See Hanif S. P. Hirji, Note, Inequalities in California’s Public School System: The Undermining of and 
the Need for a Minimum Standards System of Education, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 583, 599–600 (1999). 
For a detailed description of California’s extraordinarily complicated school funding scheme, see 
GOLDFINGER, supra note 117. 
 129. 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). 
 130. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, WASHINGTON SCHOOL FINANCE 
PRIMER 3 (1999) [hereinafter WASHINGTON SCHOOL FINANCE]. 
 131. The maximum state property tax rate is set by statute at $3.60 per $1000 of equalized 
assessed value. See WASH. REV. CODE § 84.52.065 (2004). 
 132. See WASHINGTON SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 130, at 2–3. As a total percentage of school 
revenues, the state property tax produces approximately 10% (that is, 13% of 75%). 
 133. The governor has urged an increase in the levy limit to 36%. See Linda Shaw & Jolayne 
Houtz, Education in Budget Bind, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at A1. 
 134. One Washington district that includes a mill and other industrial uses generates $5.5 million 
with a levy rate of 1.91 per $1000 assessed valuation. Its less fortunate neighbor, which enjoys no 
similar industrial property within its borders, generates only $3.5 million, and to do so must charge its 
residents almost 50% more. See In Our View: Levy Lid Heavy, THE COLUMBIAN, Mar. 15, 2003, at C6 
[hereinafter Levy Lid Heavy]. 
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assistance,”135 and is intended to equalize the results of local levies. School 
districts qualify for this assistance if the amount they can raise with a 12% 
local levy is below the total that would be generated by a 12% levy in the 
average Washington school district.136 The assistance does nothing for 
property-poor districts that are unable to convince 60% of their voters to 
pass a local levy, thus creating the double deprivation of receiving neither 
the local levy funds nor the state’s assistance funds. Moreover, it leaves all 
of the “above average” districts to enjoy the same pre-cap inequality that 
comes from wealth-based property tax levies. In addition, similar to the 
implementation of the caps in Colorado, Washington school districts with 
pre-reform local levies that exceeded those numbers were grandfathered 
in, thus protecting much of the pre-existing property-wealth-based 
inequality.137  
By the mid 1990s, Washington had nearly halved the disparity between 
rich and poor districts.138 But, as budget woes have recently intensified, 
and pressure for state funds has increased, the local levies have inevitably 
taken some of the funding pressure off the state.139 The predictable result 
of widespread reliance on local option levies, of course, is that funding 
disparities in Washington are returning to their pre-1978 inequality.140 
Shortly after the landmark Doran opinion, local levies accounted for a 
mere 8% of district budgets.141 By 2001, that figure had nearly doubled.142 
For some districts, local levies now constitute 30% of their operating 
budget, which does not compare favorably to the pre-Doran average of 
24%.143  
In essence, Washington caps, with their exemptions and exceptions, 
display much of the same inadequacy as the Colorado system described 
previously. Unlike Colorado, though, Washington’s adoption of a 
statewide property tax means that wealthy district spending is in fact 
superimposed on a system that has already undergone some statewide 
capture of revenues generated by the statewide property tax. In 
 135. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.500.010 (2004). 
 136. See LEAGUE OF EDUC. VOTERS, REALITIES OF EDUCATION FUNDING IN WASHINGTON STATE 
2002, at 19 (2002), at http://www.levfoundation.org/funding_report/realities_report.htm (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2005). 
 137. See LEAGUE OF EDUC. VOTERS, LEVY LID Q & A, at 1 (2002), at http://www.levfoundation. 
org/Levy%20Lid.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2005). 
 138. See Joondeph, supra note 49, at 809. 
 139. Levy Lid Heavy, supra note 134. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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comparison to Colorado’s caps, then, the Washington system produces 
more redistribution of property-wealth-based revenues and a greater 
limitation on wealthy district spending. Since a relatively small percentage 
of school funds in Washington come from this source,144 however, the 
redistributive sting of the statewide levy is not substantial. Just like their 
Colorado analogues, the caps have done little to reduce the gap between 
wealthy and poor districts. In fact, the irony of the Washington cap system 
is that, in terms of the gap between rich and poor districts, “[w]e are 
almost back to where we started.”145  
C. The Robin Hood Systems 
Notwithstanding the redistribution of local property tax revenues 
produced by some of the statutes discussed in this section,146 taxpayers and 
commentators appear to have reserved the “Robin Hood” epithet for 
Texas’s school funding formula and Vermont’s original Act 60.147 Both 
systems explicitly seize property tax revenues and redistribute them (or 
force the local school district itself to distribute them) to districts with less 
property wealth. Because in both statutory schemes the poorer districts’ 
enhanced state aid comes directly from the wealthy districts, with no 
substantial additional state aid,148 the cost of raising the bottom is borne 
almost exclusively by the districts at the top. Nevertheless, both systems 
reflect legislative commitments to reduce the link between school district 
funding and local property wealth and to equalize school spending; their 
differences offer interesting perspectives on the hurdles facing states that 
wish to cap luxury spending by wealthy school districts.  
 144. Only 10% of education funds are derived from the statewide property tax levy. See supra 
notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 145. See LEAGUE OF EDUC. VOTERS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF SCHOOL FINANCE IN WASHINGTON, at 
http://www.educationvoters.org/school.funding/how_did_washington_get_to_where_.htm (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2005). The phenomenon is described in a recent article as a predictable push back towards an 
“inequitable equilibrium.” See Metzler, supra note 107, at 564. The author explains: “[W]hile a court 
decision declaring the education finance system unconstitutional may force the legislature to make 
immediate changes in the system, subsequent amendments and formula modifications are likely to 
shift the allocation of resources back to the balance that existed before the court decision.” Id. at 584.  
 146. See the discussion of the statutory reforms of Washington, text accompanying supra notes 
131–36; Kansas, text accompanying infra notes 220–24; and Wyoming, text accompanying infra notes 
235–51.  
 147. The Act recently underwent substantial legislative modifications; both the original and the 
amended Vermont funding cap systems will be discussed in this section. See infra discussion at text 
accompanying notes 182–201.  
 148. This is no longer true in Vermont; recent amendments to Act 60 have come with a 
commitment of a substantial infusion of state funds. See infra note 258. 
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In Texas, the much maligned Senate Bill 7 was the legislature’s third 
attempt to implement its supreme court’s holding in Edgewood I,149 which 
had invalidated Texas’s property-tax-based school finance system. 
Concluding that although the state constitution does not require absolute 
equalization of per capita funding, the court in Edgewood I stressed that 
“districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per 
pupil at similar levels of tax effort.”150 The Texas legislature’s first 
response, known as Senate Bill 1, eliminated much of the interdistrict 
inequality by raising new taxes,151 but the Texas Supreme Court declared 
the act unconstitutional in Edgewood II.152 The court noted that while the 
law did establish a guaranteed amount of revenue per student, it 
improperly failed to address the underlying causes of the funding 
disparity, that is, the variation in property wealth among districts.153 Soon 
after, Senate Bill 351 completely revamped the school district governance 
structure, creating 188 county education districts that would levy school 
taxes.154 That law was invalidated by the court in Carrollton-Farmers 
Branch Independent School District v. Edgewood Independent School 
District (Edgewood III),155 because it violated the state constitutional 
prohibition of statewide property taxes and because it impermissibly 
imposed a property tax without voter approval.156 Finally, in Edgewood 
Independent School District v. Meno (Edgewood IV),157 the Texas 
Supreme Court upheld the legislature’s third attempt, Senate Bill 7.158 That 
law preserved much of Texas’ pre-existing two-tiered school funding 
system, which focuses on equalizing revenues for districts that impose 
equal tax rates.159  
 149. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 391.  
 150. Id. 
 151. S. 1, 74th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 1990). 
 152. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 491.  
 153. Id. at 496. 
 154. 1991 Tex Gen Laws 20 §§ 20.941–20.945, 20.947–20.948. 
 155. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992). 
 156. Id. at 524. The Texas Constitution provides: “No State ad valorem property taxes shall be 
levied on any property within this State.” TEX. CONST. art VIII, § 1-e.  
 157. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995).  
 158. Although the court upheld the statute as constitutional, it emphasized its disappointment with 
the legislative scheme: “For too long, the legislature’s response to its constitutional duty to provide for 
an efficient system has been little more than crisis management. The rationality behind such a complex 
and unwieldy system [as Senate Bill 7] is not obvious. We conclude that the system becomes 
minimally acceptable only when viewed through the prism of history. Surely Texas can and must do 
better.” Id. at 726.  
 159. Tier 1 guarantees a basic per student allotment from the state, so long as the district levies the 
required tax rate on all property. That rate is currently set at $0.86 per $100 of taxable property value. 
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.252 (Vernon 1996). If that rate does not generate the allotment, the state 
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Most controversial of Senate Bill 7’s funding reforms is the recapture 
or Robin Hood provision. Under Texas law, each school district is subject 
to a $305,000 per student maximum taxable property value cap, which is 
referred to as the district’s “equalized wealth level.”160 Any district whose 
property wealth exceeds this amount falls into the recapture range and 
must choose one or more of the following statutory options: (1) to 
consolidate with another district; (2) to detach property from its district; 
(3) to contribute money to the state that corresponds to the amount of 
excess funding generated by the property; (4) to pay for the education of 
non-resident students; or (5) to consolidate its tax base with another 
district.161 In practice, districts have chosen either option 3 or option 4, or 
a combination of the two.162
Since Edgewood IV, the funding levels across the state have been 
equalized for 90% of Texas students.163 Not all school districts, however, 
are happy with the Texas school funding reforms. In 2000, almost $1 
billion (out of a total $29 billion state school budget) was redistributed 
from wealthy to poorer districts.164 As the Robin Hood funds rise, the 
percentage of total school funding derived from property tax revenues 
rises as well; since Edgewood IV, the figure has been slowly increasing.165 
Currently, 56% of all school revenues come from the local property tax.166 
At the same time, the differential in revenues between wealthy and poor 
districts shows the same upward creep—the current funding gap between 
will make up the difference. Tier 2 operates to equalize revenues for districts that choose to tax beyond 
the minimum rate. § 42.302. Thus, the state system in essence guarantees that equal tax rates will 
generate equal revenues across the state. The Texas Supreme Court’s analysis of SB 7 provides a 
helpful narrative explanation of its main provisions. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727–28.  
 160. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 2004). 
 161. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (Vernon 1996).  
 162. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for 
Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 607, 684 (1999). 
 163. See Todd Smith, My Education on Education, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 10, 
1999, at 15. Some assessments of the Texas school finance reform are quite positive. See Eleanor 
Dougherty, Getting Beyond Policy: School Reform in Practice, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 127 (1998); 
Joseph F. Johnson, The Influence of a State Accountability System on Student Achievement in Texas, 6 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 155 (1998). For a detailed account of the Edgewood litigation, see Farr & 
Trachtenberg, supra note 162.  
 164. See West Orange-Cove, 107 S.W.3d at 570; Alberta Phillips, Reforming School Finance in 
Texas Benefits a Privileged Few, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Mar. 19, 2004, at A15. That money comes 
directly from wealthy districts, which in their totality teach 12% of all school children in Texas. Janet 
Elliott, Perry, Legislators to Seek School Finance Solutions, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 23, 2004, at 
A13.  
 165. West Orange-Cove, 107 S.W.3d at 572–73.  
 166. Phillips, supra note 164, at A15. 
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wealthy districts and a poor district such as El Paso surpasses $1,000 per 
year per pupil.167  
The inadequate funding of poor schools, when combined with the 
opposition of wealthy districts to the redistribution they feel singled out to 
bear, makes for neverending legislative disputes. Every year, legislators 
battle over the Robin Hood provisions, with frequent statutory proposals to 
end the redistribution.168 The problem, of course, is how to fund the $1 
billion shortfall. To date, the funding system implemented by Senate Bill 7 
remains intact. Its future, however, is uncertain.169  
In fairness to the Texas legislature, the volatility of the current funding 
scheme is due in no small part to three conflicting forces of Texas legal 
doctrine that the legislature must navigate. First and foremost is the state 
constitutional prohibition of a statewide property tax.170 Second, of course, 
is the Texas Supreme Court’s insistence that property wealth not dictate 
the revenues available to school districts.171 Third is the court’s somewhat 
contradictory insistence that there not be too much “leveling down” of the 
highest districts. The court has criticized what it terms the “‘equity at all 
levels’” approach, noting that its effect is to “‘level-down’ the quality of 
 167. See Gary Scharrer, Cash for Schools is a Bleak Spot, EL PASO TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at 1B. 
Plaintiffs in the West Orange-Cove litigation point to similar disparities involving the Edgewood 
school district, which receives about $1500 less per student than the top 5% of students living in the 
wealthiest school districts. That translates into $1,000,000 difference annually for a school of 600 
students. See Brief for Edgewood Intervenors at 13, West Orange-Cove, 107 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. 2003).  
 168. See Clay Robison, Bill Guaranteeing More Aid for Schools Draws Concern, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Feb. 9, 2005, at B3 (noting that “Gov. Rick Perry and Republican legislative leaders have 
been vowing for three years to repeal Robin Hood.”). 
 169. Shortly after the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Edgewood IV, four wealthy 
school districts filed suit to invalidate the property tax recapture system. By capping the rates at which 
districts can tax, and by redistributing locally raised property tax revenues, the plaintiffs allege, the 
state has violated the constitutional prohibition of state level property taxes. West Orange-Cove, 107 
S.W.3d at 562. In 2003, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ dismissal of the lawsuit 
and remanded the case for trial. The key issue in the case will be whether school districts retain 
“meaningful discretion” over their property tax levy or whether “increasing costs of education and 
evolving circumstances” have forced them to tax at maximum rates. Id. At least one justice has 
concluded that the recapture provisions are “both inequitable and unconstitutional.” Id. at 587 (Smith, 
J., dissenting).  
 170. The Texas Constitution states: “No State ad valorem taxes shall be levied upon any property 
within this State.” TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e. Oklahoma, Nebraska, and Florida have similar 
limitations. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1A; NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 1A; OKLA. CONST. art. X, 
§ 9(a). For discussion of their scope, see West Orange-Cove, 107 S.W.3d at 601–03 (Smith, J., 
dissenting) 
 171. Consider, for instance, the court’s statement in Edgewood I that the Texas Constitution “does 
not allow concentrations of resources in property-rich school districts that are taxing low when 
property-poor districts that are taxing high cannot generate sufficient revenues to meet even minimum 
standards . . . . Children who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be 
afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds.” Edgewood I, 777 
S.W.2d at 397.  
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our public school system, a consequence which is universally regarded as 
undesirable from an educational perspective.”172 It is not immediately 
apparent that any legislative scheme, at least in the absence of a massive 
infusion of state funds,173 could simultaneously achieve substantial 
redistribution of revenues, preservation of the local property tax system, 
disconnection of property wealth from school funding, and preservation of 
wealthy district spending. 
Notwithstanding the significant redistribution of wealth caused by the 
Robin Hood redistribution, the Texas caps do display some of the same 
anti-equalizing tendencies prevalent in other state cap systems. Their hold-
harmless provisions174 preserved, temporarily at least, the privileged status 
of the wealthy districts.175 In addition, equalization mandates do not apply 
to facilities funding; each district’s ability to levy a property tax of no 
more than $.50 to pay for debt translates into huge differences in 
revenue.176 For instance, a property-poor district like Edgewood must set a 
debt service levy of about $.08 to fund a $5 million bond; a wealthy 
district nearby would generate $75 million from the same tax effort.177 To 
compensate for the wealth disparity, the state provides only limited access 
to equalizing facilities funds to property-poor districts.178 One of the 
court’s Edgewood opinions warned of the problems caused by facilities 
funding schemes: “The challenge to the school finance law based on 
inadequate provision for facilities fails only because of an evidentiary 
void. Our judgment in this case should not be interpreted as a signal that 
the school finance crisis in Texas has ended.”179 Overall, however, the 
anti-equalizing forces of the Texas school funding statute pale in 
comparison to the redistributive effect of the Robin Hood recapture 
system; thus, it is not surprising that the source of most Texan opposition 
has been from wealthy donor districts and not from poorer recipient 
districts that object to the relatively small wealth-preserving provisions.  
Much like Texas’ Senate Bill 7, Vermont’s original Act 60 was also the 
product of a judicial order. In 1997, the Vermont Supreme Court’s opinion 
 172. West Orange-Cove, 107 S.W.3d at 571.  
 173. In Texas, for instance, the Attorney General calculated that it would require an amount equal 
to four times the total state budget to bring all districts up to the top. See Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 
495–96. 
 174. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 41.002(e) (Vernon 1996).  
 175. See Kramer, supra note 35, at 41. 
 176. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.0031(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). 
 177. See Brief for Edgewood Intervenors, supra note 167, at 14.  
 178. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.301 (Vernon 1996). 
 179. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 725.  
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in Brigham v. State180 invalidated the state’s district power equalizing 
formula on equal protection grounds, and ordered the legislature to “make 
educational opportunity available on substantially equal terms.”181 In stark 
contrast to the Texas legislature’s repeated efforts to meet the directives of 
the Edgewood opinion, the Vermont legislature’s swift response,182 
adopted within months of Brigham, had an immediate and profound 
redistributive effect. First, the law adopted a statewide property tax of 
$1.10 per $100 of homestead property value.183 Using those revenues, the 
state distributed a per-pupil allocation to each district.184 Any district that 
chose to levy a higher property tax rate to raise funds above that amount 
was required to turn over a percentage of the revenues generated to the 
state’s education fund.185 The higher the district’s average property value, 
the greater the percentage of revenue that was earmarked for the state;186 
after a phase-in period, the wealthy districts would ultimately pay 
approximately 70% of their excess levy to the state fund.187 This so-called 
“sharing pool,”188 also referred to as the “shark pool,”189 produced 
vehement opposition from the wealthy districts. An example from one of 
Vermont’s ski resorts (known as the “gold towns”) illustrates the impact of 
the new Act—for the town of Winhall to continue spending at pre-Act 60 
levels would have required a quadrupling of its tax rate.190 The immediate 
sting, however, was softened by the transitional phasing in of the plan as 
well as by the wealthy’s districts’ ability to circumvent the sharing pool 
through the establishment of educational foundations funded through 
private donations.191
 180. 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).  
 181. Id. at 398. 
 182. For a detailed account of the legislative response, an analysis of the political process that led 
to passage of Act 60, and an interpretation of the public’s response, see Rebell & Metzler, supra note 
86, at 179–86. 
 183. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5402(a) (Supp. 2003). 
 184. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4011(b) (2004). 
 185. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4027 (Supp. 2003). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Stowe Citizens for Responsible Gov’t v. State, 730 A.2d 573, 575 (Vt. 1999).  
 188. For descriptions of how the sharing pool worked, see Buzuvis, supra note 83, 677–78; Rebell 
& Metzler, supra note 86, at 181. 
 189. See Rebell & Metzler, supra note 86, at 167. 
 190. See id. at 182.  
 191. For the first several years after Act 60’s adoption, the Freeman Foundation matched 
donations to local school foundations. See Sarah Schweitzer, School Funding Gap Grips Vermont, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2003, at B1. One commentary describes the fairly heavy-handed fund raising 
efforts undertaken by districts seeking to retain their pre-Act 60 levels of funds. One city went so far as 
to publish the names of those who did not contribute. Some districts took more drastic measures—the 
Vermont Attorney General was forced to file suit to compel payment from three districts. See Rebell & 
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In the years following its adoption, Act 60 remained controversial. 
Although 89% of state residents paid lower property taxes under Act 60 
than they had in previous wealth-based funding systems,192 and although 
early reports suggested that equalization was correlated with some 
reduction of the gap in student achievement,193 the law was the target of 
continual legislative proposals for amendment. Finally, in 2003, as the real 
impact was about to be felt in wealthy districts,194 the Vermont legislature 
substantially amended Act 60. The amendments’ passage was heralded 
with triumphant declarations such as the Governor’s: “It ends the 
divisiveness of Act 60 by doing away with the sharing pool.”195  
On closer inspection, while it is indeed true that the actual mechanism 
of the sharing pool has been largely, but not completely, eliminated, the 
amount of redistribution of local property taxes for wealthy Vermont 
school districts remains very high. As amended, Act 60 retains the 
statewide property tax, which in and of itself produces substantial 
redistribution of locally generated revenues. Those property tax revenues 
are pooled at the state level and allocated on the basis of a district’s 
enrollment and not its property wealth. Moreover, the newly created “split 
grand list”196 divides all property into two categories: homestead 
property197 is subjected to a tax rate of $1.10, while all nonresidential 
property (including vacation homes and other non-primary residences)198 
is assessed at $1.59.199 That levy provides every school district with the 
state base amount of $6,800 per pupil, irrespective of the revenues it 
actually generates in any particular district.200 The equalized $6,800 base 
amount is supplemented by categorical grants for specialized needs, such 
as special education and transportation costs.201  
Metzler, supra note 86, at 183. 
 192. See Rebell & Metzler, supra note 86, at 182. 
 193. See Downes, supra note 61, at 22; Rebell & Metzler, supra note 86, at 185.  
 194. Rebell & Metzler, supra note 86, at 186. 
 195. Candace Page, Funding Reform Gets Step Closer, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, May 29, 2003, 
at 1B.  
 196. Id. According to Vermont’s governor, that innovation “was one of the most important 
features of the bill.” Id.  
 197. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5401(7) (Supp. 2003). 
 198. See tit. 32, § 5401(10). 
 199. The tax rates for both homestead and nonresidential property are established in VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 32, § 5402 (Supp. 2003). An additional progressive feature of the Vermont school property 
tax is its income sensitivity; though the formula is complicated, property tax burdens are lowered for 
those with incomes under $75,000. tit. 32, §§ 6061, 6066. 
 200. See tit. 16, § 4011(b). 
 201. Categorical grants are used to fund special education, transportation, small schools, aid for 
state-placed students, technical education, and essential early education. See VERMONT DEP’T. OF 
EDUC., OVERVIEW OF VERMONT’S EDUCATION FUNDING SYSTEM UNDER ACT 68, at 1 (2003) 
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Under the amended Vermont system, school districts that wish to tax 
themselves at a higher rate than the state-imposed levy of $1.10 may do 
so. The voters, however, may only impose higher levies on homestead 
property; all non-residential and non-homestead property in the state 
remains taxed at a fixed $1.59 rate. Moreover, the legislation treats all 
districts alike in their supplemental tax efforts. Pursuant to voter approval, 
a district may decide to generate, say, 10% more revenue than the 
guaranteed base, or $680 in additional funds per pupil. To receive that 
amount, the voters must agree to increase their tax levy by 10%;202 the 
actual amount generated by the levy is irrelevant. In essence, Vermont 
applies a district power equalizer approach to supplemental local levies.203 
The new law, however, goes one step further for districts that seek to 
preserve their luxury spending rates. Any district that chooses to spend 
more than the state-determined “excess spending” limit,204 which in 2005 
is any budget that exceeds 35% of the average state spending level from 
the previous year, is subject to an “additional tax rate.”205 At high levels, 
then, the sharing pool has been preserved.  
According to some reports, the new Act has proved to be much more 
popular than its Robin Hood predecessor. One source noted the increased 
ease with which school budgets are now being approved, in contrast to the 
Act 60 years when many were rejected outright.206 The source of the 
alleged newfound popularity, however, is not readily apparent. The 
amended Act 60 continues the substantial redistribution of what, in the 
pre-Brigham years, were local revenues, generated by local wealth and 
preserved for local school districts. One part of the answer may be the 
addition of substantial statewide funding, which lessens the direct 
connection between local property wealth and school funding. With the 
adoption of the amended Act 60 came the state legislature’s pledge of 
approximately $73,000,000 in increased state funding for education, 
generated from an increase in the state sales tax, several other taxes, and a 
[hereinafter VERMONT’S EDUCATION FUNDING SYSTEM]. Thus, the “equality” that Vermont seeks is 
not a rigid adherence to equal amounts of money on a per capita basis, but rather a system that adjusts 
funding in accordance with the special needs of each district’s children. See supra discussion at text 
accompanying notes 180–91.  
 202. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5402 (Supp. 2004). 
 203. See supra discussion and sources cited at notes 198–201.  
 204. See tit. 32 § 5401(12)-(13). 
 205. See id. The Vermont Department of Education describes the formula in greater detail. See 
VERMONT’S EDUCATION FUNDING SYSTEM, supra note 201, at 4–5.  
 206. See Molly Walsh, Burlington Commercial Taxes Expected to Spike, BURLINGTON FREE 
PRESS, Mar. 13, 2004, at 1B.  
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new lottery.207 Vermont’s new system, however, continues to rely heavily 
on the property tax—the state’s Department of Education estimates that 
almost 65% of total education revenues in 2005 will be derived from the 
property tax.208  
Another possible explanation for the greater popular acceptance of the 
amended Act 60 is more subtle, having to do with the way in which the 
amendments may have produced a shift in the taxpayers’ mentality. The 
loss of the highly touted “ownership”209 or control of local property 
revenues appears to have been accepted by a firm majority of 
Vermonters.210 Of course, for the extremely wealthy Vermont school 
districts, the opposition remains virulent. And in fact, the sting felt by 
those districts continues unabated; in Killington, for instance, the town’s 
property will generate a $9.7 million increase in property taxes, while the 
town’s schools will receive only slightly more than $2 million.211  
Like the cap states discussed in this section, both Texas and Vermont 
have taken important steps to break the link between property wealth and 
school funding, and to limit spending by wealthy districts. In both states, 
notwithstanding the familiar problems of hold-harmless provisions and 
exemptions for capital facilities, the legislative scheme creates a 
meaningful cap on the revenues that can be generated by local property 
wealth. At the same time, both states redistribute substantial amounts of 
wealth from rich to poor districts. In some ways, then, they are similar to 
the caps discussed in earlier sections. Their uniqueness, however, stems 
 207. Specifically, the new revenue sources include a 1% increase in the sales tax, a 1% increase in 
the tax on telecommunications service, a .50% increase in the transfer tax on nonresidential property, 
and a new Powerball lottery estimated to bring in a bit more than $3 million per year. See Vermont 
Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Legislative Update (2003), available at http://www.vtvsba.org/legis/final2003.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2005).  
 208. VERMONT’S EDUCATION FUNDING SYSTEM, supra note 201, at 2.  
 209. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 180–91. In Homevoter Hypothesis, the 
author extols the ownership model and contends that severing property taxation from local control will 
prove disastrous to local government coffers. FISCHEL, supra note 76; see infra text accompanying 
notes 270–76. 
 210. See Molly Walsh, Tax Reform Helps School Budgets Pass, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Mar. 
3, 2004, at 1A. Moreover, opposition to the original Act 60 may have been overstated. As one 
commentary has pointed out, the Republican candidate for governor in 1998 made Act 60 a central 
campaign issue, promising to repeal it if elected. Incumbent Governor Howard Dean, however, was 
reelected with a 56% vote. Anecdotal stories about failed school budgets do not comport with the 
study’s finding that only 10 out of 300 school budget measures were defeated in the year after Act 60 
was adopted. In years previous, an average of 27 budgets were defeated. See Rebell & Metzler, supra 
note 86, at 184–85. 
 211. See Diane Allen, Tax Frustration, Fantasy Reflected in Secession Vote, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Mar. 7, 2004, at B1. As the title of the article suggests, the application of the state’s new school 
funding law led to a Killington town vote to secede from Vermont and join New Hampshire. The 25 
miles between Killington and the New Hampshire border apparently did not dissuade the voters. Id. 
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from the ways in which they have implemented the caps. In Texas, it has 
been accomplished by forcing the wealthy districts themselves to transfer 
revenues generated locally. Vermont’s original Act 60 accomplished the 
cap in much the same way, with the term “sharing pool” used to refer to 
the direct recapture and redistribution of local property tax revenues. 
Vermont’s amended Act 60, in contrast, achieves similar levels of 
redistribution without the hated sharing pool. Fundamental to its 
legislative reforms is its decision to change the level at which the property 
tax is imposed. This relatively straightforward and uncomplicated shift, 
one admittedly not available to Texas because of its constitutional 
prohibition on a state property tax,212 may be the key reason why 
Vermont’s amended Act 60 appears to have gained the political support 
needed to legitimize the reforms. In Section IV, this Article will return to a 
consideration of the ways in which a shift to state level property taxation 
may be an essential component of any state statutory plan to cap the 
spending of wealthy districts.213 It will suggest that meaningful limits on 
local district spending will only be successful if the state can break the 
current stranglehold of ownership produced when local property wealth 
generates local property tax revenues.  
D. Beyond Caps and Recapture 
The caps and recapture plans described in previous parts of this section 
do not, of course, invariably result in equalization of school funding. They 
should, however, accomplish the dual purposes of slowing the growth of 
the disparity between the wealthy and poor districts while simultaneously 
imposing meaningful limits on the wealthy districts’ ability to tax 
themselves and spend at increasingly higher levels. As the earlier 
discussion of existing caps and recapture plans has shown, their failure to 
accomplish those goals lies in the crafting and implementation of the 
legislative system—be it through hold-harmless provisions, exemptions of 
capital expenditures, or generous local levy options—and not in the theory 
of caps itself.  
For at least two states currently embroiled in litigation and sparring 
among the judiciary, the legislature, the state board of education, and the 
school districts, the judiciary has made clear that even rigorous 
implementation of spending caps would fall short of state constitutional 
guarantees. Recent judicial opinions issued by the courts of Kansas and 
 212. See supra note 156. 
 213. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 283–95. 
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Wyoming appear to conclude that nothing short of absolute equalization 
can survive constitutional challenge.214 In many ways, the trajectory of 
school funding litigation in those states follows a familiar pattern—
judicial invalidation of funding statutes, followed by legislative reform, 
which was in turn followed by the incremental creep back towards the 
unequal funding schemes that prompted the litigation in the first place, 
thus triggering a new round of litigation.215 What is unusual about the most 
recent opinions of the Kansas and Wyoming courts, however, is how the 
demonstrated ineffectiveness of the legislative reforms has produced, not 
grudging judicial acceptance of an admittedly imperfect system, but rather 
a categorical rejection of the legislative efforts.216 In the words of the 
Wyoming Supreme Court: “[A constitutional school funding scheme] 
must not create a level of spending which is a function of wealth other 
than the wealth of the state as a whole.”217 This approach, of course, leaves 
little, if any, room for the wealthy districts to generate supplemental 
revenues for their own schools. 
In a legal challenge to Kansas school funding laws filed in the early 
1990s, a trial court invalidated the state’s property-based school finance 
statute. The court’s opinion in Mock v. State held that the state had a 
nondelegable duty to provide an equal educational opportunity to each 
child, regardless of the wealth of the child’s school district.218 In addition, 
the court stressed that the state’s constitutional guarantee of an adequate 
education imposed substantive, qualitative standards as well as 
requirements for equitable financing.219 In response to the court’s opinion, 
the legislature enacted the School District Finance and Quality 
 214. See infra notes 214–54 and accompanying text. 
 215. A recent article describes this phenomenon as the inevitable push towards an “inequitable 
equilibrium.” See Metzler, supra note 107. The author documents the widespread frequency with 
which legislative reforms to school funding formulas are undone, as new legislation incrementally 
restores the invalidated inequality.  
 216. Compare the Texas Supreme Court’s reluctant decision to uphold its state’s third attempt to 
meet the requirements of the court’s earlier opinions: “For too long, the Legislature’s response to its 
constitutional duty to provide for an efficient system has been little more than crisis management. The 
rationality behind such a complex and unwieldy system is not obvious. We conclude that the system 
becomes minimally acceptable only when viewed through the prism of history. Surely Texas can and 
must do better.” Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 726.  
 217. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 336 (Wyo. 1980). 
 218. Mock v. State, Case No. 91-CV-1009 (Shawnee County Dist. Court, Oct. 14, 1991) 
(extensively described and quoted in the district’s court recent decision in Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-
1738, 2003 WL 22902963 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003)). 
 219. The court stated: “In addition to equality of educational opportunity, there is another 
constitutional requirement and that relates to the duty of the legislature to furnish enough total dollars 
so that the educational opportunities afforded every child are also suitable.” Montoy, 2003 WL 
22902963, at *11. 
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Performance Act,220 which establishes an equal base allotment distributed 
on a per-pupil basis as well as additional funding for students with special 
needs.221 The law requires each school district to levy a property tax at a 
state specified rate;222 if the district’s property wealth generates more than 
the state-determined amount, those revenues are “recaptured” and go to 
the state for redistribution to poorer districts.223 Additional local option 
levies were authorized, but limited to an amount equal to no more than 
25% of the total budget and “power equalized” for all districts below the 
75th percentile in terms of property value.224  
Because of the ways in which the new law redistributed money that had 
previously been controlled by the wealthy school districts, a number of 
wealthy districts filed suit to challenge the recapture provisions as an 
uncompensated taking of property. The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the 
state’s new law in Unified School District No. 229 v. State,225 concluding 
that the scheme rationally provided suitable financing to Kansas school 
children. It rejected the challengers’ “dumbing down” arguments that the 
new system impermissibly “cut[s] off the mountain tops to fill in the 
valleys,”226 and stressed that the state as a whole is affected by the quality 
of the education received by each and every Kansas student.227  
Less than a decade after the Unified School District opinion, another 
challenge to the funding statute was filed,228 this time by poor school 
districts alleging that, notwithstanding the Act’s caps and limits on 
optional local levies, Kansas school finance laws no longer complied with 
the landmark opinion’s insistence that “[t]he education of each similarly 
situated student is to be equally funded regardless of where he or she 
resides.”229 The trial court’s opinion in that ongoing litigation230 agreed 
 220. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6405 et seq. (1992); see Montoy, 2003 WL 22902963, at *26.  
 221. See Montoy, 2003 WL 22902963, at **26–27.  
 222. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6431 (Supp. 2004).  
 223. § 72-6431(d). 
 224. Under this scheme, all districts whose total assessed property value placed them in the lowest 
75% of school districts would receive supplemental state funding to guarantee that the local option 
budget generated a certain amount of funding irrespective of the wealth of the district. For the top 25% 
of districts, of course, the amount of revenue generated could be substantially greater, and depended 
exclusively on the amount of property wealth within the district. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6435 (1992); 
Montoy, 2003 WL 22902963, at *27. 
 225. Unified Sch. Dist., 885 P.2d 1170. 
 226. Id. at 1184. 
 227. Id. at 1195. 
 228. Montoy, 2003 WL 22902963. 
 229. Unified Sch. Dist., 885 P.2d at 1195.  
 230. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555 (Kan. Dist. Ct. May 11, 2004); Montoy, 
2003 WL 22902963, at *50. As this Article was in press, the Kansas Supreme Court partially reversed 
the district court. See Montoy v. State, 102 P.3d 1160 (Kan. 2005). 
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with the plaintiffs, noting how the disparity between wealthy and poor 
districts has climbed back to its pre-Mock levels, reaching a 300% 
disparity between the top and the bottom.231 The sources of the increasing 
inequality are multiple—local levies of up to 25% of total budgets; 
absence of state funds for capital expenditures; no cap on local spending 
for capital expenditures; extra funds for districts with declining 
enrollments; and hold-harmless provisions that have preserved the funding 
advantages of wealthy districts.232 In response to this evidence of financial 
inequality, the trial court has taken a categorical stance, insisting that the 
state constitution requires complete severance of the wealth of a school 
district and the quality of its educational opportunity: “[D]ifferences in per 
pupil spending, to pass constitutional muster, must be premised on actual 
differences in costs incurred to provide an essentially equal educational 
opportunity for all Kansas children.”233  
The Kansas experience displays a familiar circular progression from 
judicial equalization order to legislative reform to “back to where we 
started.”234 That the Kansas legislature’s response was destined to produce 
wealth-based disparities between districts was certainly apparent when the 
Kansas Supreme Court upheld the state’s school funding scheme in its 
1994 opinion in Unified School District. What the court must not have 
anticipated was that the caps and recapture would be structured in such a 
way as to bring the disparity back to its previous magnitude. Thus, the trial 
court’s current unequivocal rejection of the connection between property 
wealth and school funding and its blanket prohibition of any formula that 
allocates money on the basis of district property wealth may be based 
more on its impatience with the legislature than on an ideological 
opposition to a modest amount of luxury spending by wealthy districts. In 
 231. Montoy, 2003 WL 22902963 at *37.  
 232. Id. at **33–37.  
 233. Id. at *21. The following year, the trial court issued another order in the case, noting that 
state legislative reforms over that year period were still inadequate. Montoy, 2004 WL 1094555. The 
court enjoined all further operation of the unconstitutional scheme and ordered the State to “terminate 
all spending functions under the unconstitutional funding provisions, effectively putting our school 
system on ‘pause’ until the unconstitutional funding defects are remedied by the legislative and 
executive branches of our government.” Id. at *11. Seeking to be “crystal clear,” the court noted that: 
“If school funding is not based on actual costs incurred by our schools in providing a suitable 
education for our children, no one, not this Court, not the Supreme Court, not the schools, not the 
public, and not even the Legislature itself will ever be able to objectively determine whether that 
funding meets the dual requirements of our Constitution, those being 1) adequacy and 2) equity.” Id. at 
*14. 
 234. See supra text accompanying notes 138–45. The sequence is consistent with Jeffrey 
Metzler’s theory of inequitable equilibrium that pervades school finance reform. Metzler, supra note 
107. 
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any event, if Montoy is ultimately affirmed by the state’s higher courts, 
Kansas will have become one of the few states to have gone beyond caps 
to require not only a limit on spending by wealthy districts, but also a total 
severance of the link between district property wealth and school 
revenues.  
In many ways, the Wyoming school funding controversy parallels the 
Kansas experience described above. In judicial opinions going back to 
1971, the Wyoming Supreme Court has expressed its dissatisfaction with 
property-based school funding schemes and the inevitable inequality they 
produce,235 typically because of the uneven distribution of mineral wealth 
across the state. In its 1980 opinion in Washakie County School District 
No. One v. Herschler,236 the court squarely invalidated the Wyoming 
school funding formula, holding that the law’s reliance on local property 
wealth rendered the entire scheme unconstitutional under both the 
constitution’s education clause and its equal protection clause.237 Its 
lengthy opinion repeatedly stressed that a child’s access to education 
cannot be a function of the district’s wealth,238 and that the state legislature 
had the constitutional obligation to reform state law to produce both 
equality of financing and equality of quality.239 Though the court noted 
that its view of equality did not require mathematical precision in per-
pupil revenues, it stressed that the funding formula could be adjusted for 
“special needs educational cost differentials” but not for “district 
wealth.”240  
For whatever reason, the Wyoming legislature appears not to have 
taken the court at its word. Though it created some equalization of funding 
by recapturing funds from districts whose tax levy generated more than a 
fixed amount,241 it left many wealth-based formulas in place. Once again, 
the Wyoming Supreme Court came down hard on the legislative response, 
declaring it unconstitutional in Big Horn County School District No. One 
v. Campbell County School District (Campbell I).242 Chief among the 
 235. See Johnson v. Schrader, 507 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1973); Sweetwater County Planning Comm. 
for the Org. of Sch. Dists. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).  
 236. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 310.  
 237. Id. at 336. 
 238. Id. at 332, 336–37. 
 239. Id. at 334–35. 
 240. Id. at 336. 
 241. For a full description of Wyoming’s post-Washakie funding reforms, see Campbell I, 907 
P.2d at 1248–50; see also William E. Sparkman, John Dayton & Fred Hartmeister, Financing 
Wyoming’s Public Schools: The Wyoming Legislature Gets to Try Again, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 
469, 476–78 (1996).  
 242. Campbell I, 907 P.2d at 1238. 
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funding mechanisms targeted by the court for invalidation were: a 
provision allowing local districts to retain 109% of the funds generated 
locally that exceeded the state average;243 statutory allowance of an 
optional local levy;244 and capital construction financing provisions that 
relied on local bond issues.245 All of these provisions, the court concluded, 
were “tarred with the same brush of disparate tax resources.”246 As if to 
underscore its irritation with the legislature’s refusal to comply with its 
earlier directives, the court noted the increasing magnitude of school 
funding inequality.247 While the Washakie funding disparity between rich 
and poor districts—found to be unconstitutional in 1980—was $2,360, 
approximately 10 years later, that difference had grown to $13,016.248
In two opinions issued since Campbell I, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
has continued to hold the legislature’s feet to the fire, and the complexion 
of its supervision of the Wyoming legislative process has changed. In 
State v. Campbell County School District (Campbell II),249 and State v. 
Campbell County School District (Campbell III),250 the court engaged in 
painstaking, detailed review of numerous specific funding allocation 
provisions, holding each to the constitutional standard that the only 
permissible deviations in funding equality were those based on cost. The 
intensive review prompted the dissent of one justice, who complained that 
the court had crossed the line of justiciability and had usurped the function 
of the political process.251
In sum, Kansas and Wyoming stand out for the vehemence with which 
their courts have rejected the types of funding reforms that are frequently 
upheld by other state courts. In both of these states, the legislatures’ failure 
to remove the wealth-based disparities in spite of clear judicial mandates 
produced not grudging acceptance of a highly convoluted and complex 
funding scheme but rather categorical invalidation of the inadequate 
legislative response and an unequivocal imposition of the equality norm. 
With their apparent willingness to require absolute equalization and a total 
ban on luxury spending, Kansas and Wyoming have become the school 
finance equivalent of the prohibitive sumptuary laws described by 
 243. Id. at 1267–69. 
 244. Id. at 1269–74. 
 245. Id. at 1274–75. 
 246. Id. at 1275 (quoting Washakie, 606 P.2d at 337).  
 247. Campbell I, 907 P.2d at 1279. 
 248. Id. at 1251 n.13 (citing Washakie, 606 P.2d at 338–39). 
 249. Campbell II, 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001). 
 250. Campbell III, 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001). 
 251. Id. at 338 (Voigt, J., dissenting).  
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Professor Frank in Luxury Fever.252 In his discussion of private 
consumption patterns, Frank argued that government attempts to prohibit 
luxury spending are destined to failure and will inevitably result in evasive 
or avoidance behavior.253 Whether the positions taken by the Kansas and 
Wyoming courts are sustainable over the long haul, of course, remains to 
be seen. Nevertheless, the battle that lies ahead for those states is no longer 
to determine allowable spending levels but rather the equally divisive task 
of translating equality into dollars and cents.254  
E. Summary 
All of the statutes described in this section impose some limit on the 
spending of wealthy school districts. Typically, however, the programs fail 
to produce the spending limits on which the schemes were premised. As 
the earlier discussions have shown, in the case of most spending caps, this 
is because the caps are often not really caps at all. Rather, in many cases, 
they allow supplemental local spending that may exceed the cap by a 
significant percentage. In other cases, the caps’ exemptions and exceptions 
are so profoundly gap-enhancing in their effects that the pre-existing levels 
of school district wealth disparities can, and do, quickly resurface. All in 
all, adherence to the ideal of caps without clear legislative commitment to 
prohibit the anti-equalizing forces that have made their way into most state 
caps schemes does little to deal with luxury spending by wealthy school 
districts. At the other end of the spectrum, the caps insisted on by the 
Kansas and Wyoming courts are categorical and absolutely equalizing. 
They remove all school district discretion to “overspend” and insist that all 
revenue differential among districts be based exclusively on differing costs 
 252. See FRANK, supra note 20, at 199–201. In an admittedly cursory review, Frank describes the 
failed efforts of numerous government attempts to prohibit luxury spending, beginning with the 
Roman Empire and continuing up through the 19th century. He concludes that collective action to curb 
spending by the wealthiest segments of society is more legitimate and more effective if it takes the 
form of taxation rather than prohibition. This conclusion leads him to the proposal of a Luxury Fever 
tax. See supra discussion at note 20. 
 253. See FRANK, supra note 20, at 199. That observation led Frank to propose this a steeply 
progressive luxury tax would be more effective than governmental regulation or prohibition of luxury 
spending. See id. at 207–13. For my proposal to adopt a similar luxury tax limit on school spending, 
see infra text accompanying notes 308–17. 
 254. For instance, in Kansas, large urban school districts have challenged the legislative weighting 
factor that gives small, declining rural districts an extra allocation, see Montoy, 2003 WL 22902963 at 
*27, while in Wyoming the dispute is over whether the presence of large mines within a town imposes 
social costs that must be reflected with an additional educational payment. See Campbell I, 907 P.2d at 
1268–69. The courts of both states have insisted that equalization does not mean simply a per-capita 
equality; rather, the formula must be sensitive to individual student needs. Id. at 1269; Montoy, 2003 
WL 22902963 at *30.  
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and student needs. Though the equalization they require may impose a 
more absolute limit on luxury spending than the system of any other state, 
it is not clear whether their absolute and prohibitory nature will render 
them unsustainable over the long term.  
In terms of their redistributive effect, the caps and recapture plans of 
Texas and Vermont are no more extreme than some of those found in the 
other caps states. Yet their galvanizing effect on wealthy districts makes 
them politically unstable, the object of continual vilification by the 
districts that feel unfairly singled out to bear the burden of bringing up the 
bottom. As the next section will suggest,255 it may be that luxury spending 
cannot realistically be capped unless the state is able to end the 
stranglehold exerted by the sense of local ownership of property taxes that 
pervades most states’ tax structures. If that is in fact the case, the problem 
of capping luxury school spending may lie not so much in the 
determination to equalize school revenues as in the application of the 
equalization norm to a system where the proprietary control of tax 
revenues has become an apparently permanent part of the landscape. 
IV. BREAKING THE STRANGLEHOLD OF OWNERSHIP 
A. The “Get What You Pay For” Model 
Commentators have noticed the increasingly proprietary sense that 
pervades taxpayers’ attitudes about “their” local property tax revenues.256 
As the consumer model of government becomes more entrenched in the 
mentality of local residents, the payment of taxes is equated with market 
transactions, in which intelligent consumers weigh individual costs and 
benefits before making a purchase. Transferred to the world of local 
government, this means that the taxpayer assesses the legitimacy of taxes 
much as she would evaluate the potential purchase of a television set, 
asking whether the money she pays provides her with a sufficient 
municipal service bang for her tax buck. With the efficiency-driven market 
approach comes a heightened sense of ownership of the revenues: if I am 
purchasing services much like I purchase a television set, it is not 
unreasonable for me to expect that the money that I “spend” on taxes will 
redound to my individual benefit. With that mindset, an anti-redistributive 
 255. See infra text accompanying notes 256–307.  
 256. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 76, at 625; Frug, supra note 74, at 29–31; Reynolds, supra note 
81, at 430–41; Schragger, supra note 77, at 1827–29. 
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attitude is a natural corollary. After all, since I don’t pay for your 
television set, why should I pay for your schools?  
In most states, the ownership of property tax revenues for local schools 
goes unquestioned. Coupled with that absolute ownership is the similarly 
unrestrained local discretion to set the tax rate and to determine the 
amount of local funds to be generated by that rate for local schools. Those 
states that have dared to interfere with the wealthy districts’ ownership of 
local revenues, whether by capping district spending or by requiring a 
reallocation of the revenues, have been met with strong political 
opposition. Though caps and other limits on spending by wealthy districts 
are universally unpopular, it is the states that have superimposed a 
requirement of wealth redistribution on a firmly entrenched and locally 
“owned” tax system that have encountered the most virulent reaction.  
The funding reforms instituted in Texas257 and Vermont258 provide the 
clearest examples of state efforts to redistribute wealth from rich to poor 
without interfering with the essential local ownership of property taxes. In 
both cases, state laws require school districts to generate revenues with the 
local property tax and to then distribute some of those funds to poorer 
districts. That is, both state systems acknowledge the districts’ ownership 
of the revenues, and then order them to give those revenues up. In Texas, 
the school districts’ ownership is implicit in the statutory scheme, which 
gives wealthy districts choices about how to redistribute their excess 
revenues themselves.259 In Vermont’s original Act 60, though the 
ownership issue was more subtle because the revenues were taken and 
redistributed by the state, the very use of the term “sharing pool” 
inevitably reinforced the districts’ claim of ownership of the redistributed 
revenues. After all, sharing is an action that can only be taken by an 
owner. With the ownership of the revenues reinforced by the schemes 
themselves, it is not surprising that they produced relentless opposition.  
In a recent book review, Professor Richard Schragger described the 
proprietary model of local taxation and came away quite troubled by the 
 257. See supra text accompanying notes 147–179. 
 258. See supra text accompanying notes 180–211. This discussion in this section refers to 
Vermont’s original Act 60. The legislature’s amendments have fundamentally altered the Vermont 
scheme, by adopting a split grand list for purposes of a statewide property tax and removing non-
homestead property from local control for local luxury spending. 
 259. As noted earlier, Texas’s Constitution prohibits the adoption of a statewide property tax. See 
supra note 156. Thus, the legislature must choose between the preservation of local ownership of 
property taxes and the use of statewide taxes other than the property tax to fund education. Given the 
experience of many states, which have seen school funding decrease when non-property taxes at the 
statewide level have been adopted to fund education, it is not surprising that the legislature has sought 
to preserve the use of local property taxes for education. See infra text accompanying notes 104–255. 
Washington University Open Scholarship













assumptions on which it is based.260 Fundamentally, the proprietary model 
relies on what Schragger calls a “naturalized view of local boundaries,”261 
ignoring the “distributional choice”262 implicit in all local government 
systems, which require state authorization and delegation of authority. 
Without state permission, wealthy municipalities would not be able to use 
their zoning powers to exclude the poor and to insulate themselves from 
the costs created by the presence of poorer citizens and their reduced 
ability to generate taxes for local services. Because the poor must live 
somewhere, of course, the ability of wealthy jurisdictions to exclude them 
necessarily depends on a “parasitic relationship”263 with communities that 
have no choice but to house those with few resources and potentially high 
service needs. 
As he reflected on the sense of ownership that is firmly cemented in the 
minds of suburban voters, Schragger noted how it produces an often 
virulent resistance to the redistribution of local tax revenues to other less 
fortunate jurisdictions.264 In contrast, those same citizens are unlikely to 
expend similar amounts of vitriol to oppose the substantial redistribution 
frequently produced by payment of their much higher state and federal 
income taxes. New Jersey residents, he noted, pay $2,342 more per capita 
in federal taxes than they receive in federal spending,265 yet the Robin 
Hood rally cry rarely surfaces in anti-tax efforts at those levels of 
government. 
Schragger’s New Jersey example, when contrasted with the opposition 
of wealthy taxpayers to the Texas and Vermont school funding schemes, 
suggests that it is not solely the redistribution of tax revenues that 
provokes the ire of taxpayers, but, in addition, the disconnect between the 
level of government at which the taxes are levied and the level of 
government at which the revenues are spent.266 When the property tax is 
 260. Schragger, supra note 77. 
 261. Id. at 1848. 
 262. Id. at 1850. 
 263. Id. at 1850. 
 264. Id. at 1847. 
 265. Id. at 1847 n.74.  
 266. Charles R. Weaver Metropolitan Revenue Distribution Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473F 
(2000). The Act is a striking exception to the generalization that redistribution is typically 
accomplished by the government that has levied the redistributive tax. The Act requires municipal 
governments in the Minneapolis metropolitan area to share the increase in their tax revenues generated 
by new commercial and industrial development. See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 1764, 1821–22 (2002). The absence of other examples suggests the force of the 
generalization. In the case of the Minnesota legislation, it appears that the legislature was convinced 
that the sharing of revenues redounded to the enhanced welfare of each constituent government unit. 
Those arguments were made most forcefully by Myron Orfield, then a Minnesota legislator, who has 
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levied locally, taxpayers assert the ownership and control that comes with 
local taxation, and redistribution of the revenues produces cries of Robin 
Hood. In contrast, in those states where schools are funded increasingly 
from state sources, the ownership of school tax revenues appears to have 
lost much of its force.267 It is almost as if a shift in the level of funding 
forces a shift in the debate, with Robin Hood cries disappearing when the 
taxing jurisdiction is also the spending jurisdiction.  
Calls for state funding of local school systems are, of course, not 
new.268 And in fact, most state finance reform is moving toward ever 
greater state shares of school funding.269 At the same time, though, the vast 
majority of the states leave the local property tax in place as an important 
source of revenue. That is, though the state’s share continues to grow, the 
local portion remains important and generally offsets the redistributive 
effect of the state funding. Defending the local property tax as an 
important manifestation of local control, state after state has refused to 
upset the apple cart of the local property tax. What the previous review of 
many of the caps states has shown, however, is that the reforms are often 
counterproductive. They preserve huge inequalities between districts and 
leave state funding efforts in a continual catch-up race, trying to 
supplement the revenues of poor districts while the wealthy continue to tax 
and spend at ever higher levels.  
B. What About the Homevoter? 
In Homevoter Hypothesis,270 Professor William Fischel makes much of 
the phenomenon of property tax ownership. In his view, it is a model to be 
encouraged, because it pushes towards the optimal distribution of 
government services.271 Moreover, in the homevoter world, homeowners 
argued in favor of joint regional action to address the problems that plague inner cities and declining 
suburbs alike. See generally MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS (rev. ed. 1997). In the context of 
schools, the argument would be that school districts should be willing to pool their resources to 
promote the education of all children, because of the long-term societal interest in having an educated 
citizenry. Policy-making at the local level, however, appears inextricably tied to short-term, rather than 
long-term, interests. See Paul D. Gottlieb, The Effects of Poverty on Metropolitan Area Economic 
Performance, in URBAN-SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES 38 (Rosalind Greenstein & Wim Wiewel 
eds., 2000). 
 267. See supra text accompanying notes 209–10.  
 268. See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark, Note, Rethinking Statewide Taxation of Nonresidential Property for 
Public Schools, 102 YALE L.J. 805 (1992). 
 269. See supra note 7. 
 270. See Fischel, supra note 76.  
 271. The market model of local government finance was first articulated by Charles M. Tiebout. 
Tiebout, supra note 74, at 416. Tiebout emphasized the efficiency gains inherent in a system in which 
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protect their property values by supporting municipal services, and by 
paying for them with their taxes. In this view, municipal tax payments are 
an important means of preserving the homevoter’s investment. Moreover, 
Fischel warns, if the link between property ownership and control of local 
tax revenues is broken, the homevoter will rebel. As an example, he points 
to California. When the California Supreme Court invalidated the 
property-tax-based school funding scheme, ruling that it impermissibly 
preserved entrenched inequality and unfairly burdened poor districts,272 he 
argues, the California voter responded with Proposition XIII,273 the most 
famous of all voter-initiated tax caps. In Fischel’s analysis, the California 
property owner was unwilling to tolerate a system that deprived local 
communities of the substantial wealth generation power captured by the 
property tax system.274  
Fischel’s model is based on the experience of one highly unusual 
state,275 and it is as much an ideological defense as a descriptive analytical 
tool. Not surprisingly, it has spawned analysis and commentary that 
dispute the empirical and normative strength of his claims.276 For those 
who are troubled by the distributive implications of the homevoter model, 
particularly as applied to public education, alternatives to Fischel’s theory 
all point in the same direction. If the homevoter is allowed to use the 
municipal tax base as a means of protecting her investment in her home, 
she will continue to do so. The inevitable result is a metropolitan 
landscape where some privileged communities are able to create enclaves 
of high property values and where owners tax themselves to pay for the 
services they and their similarly situated neighbors all want. At the same 
time, the less wealthy, often taxing themselves at higher rates than their 
local governments compete with each other to attract consumer-voters. The theory is based on the 
assumption that individuals can, and will, freely choose to live within the borders of a local 
government that provides the desired level of service. Tiebout’s model has generated substantial 
debate; for a summary of the salient points, see Reynolds, supra note 74, at 101–08.  
 272. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1263–66. 
 273. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. 
 274. See Fischel, supra note 76, at 98–127. 
 275. At the same time that property values were rising rapidly, California began to experience the 
influx of large numbers of Latino immigrants, whose education and income levels were generally 
lower than the average California voter. The decision to cap property taxes, therefore, could also be 
related to the unwillingness of wealthier Californians to fund education for the children of their new, 
poorer neighbors. Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martínez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of 
Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1239 (2000). One 
statistical analysis of the voting patterns in California argues that Proposition XIII is best explained as 
based on “a populist, anti-government instinct, not a reaction to Serrano.” Stark & Zasloff, supra note 
95, at 833. 
 276. See Stark & Zasloff, supra note 95; see also Fennell, supra note 76; Schragger, supra note 
77. 
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privileged counterparts, continue to suffer the consequences of inadequate 
and underfunded schools. As long as state law recognizes and tolerates the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between property value and level of 
government services, school finance reform will not be able to correct the 
current maldistribution of revenues.  
If Fischel’s model is an accurate description of the redistributive 
malfunction that plagues our schools, then we must look to the model to 
identify the cause. If Fischel is correct that the strength of the connection 
between property ownership and municipal services is the lynchpin that 
holds the current suburban landscape together, then those who oppose the 
pattern of redistributive inequality it produces are led to the conclusion 
that the lynchpin is also the key to dismantling the system. Ultimately, of 
course, whether the homevoter world is a model to eliminate or emulate 
comes down to a basic political question about the role of government in 
the redistribution of resources. In the context of school funding, however, 
a growing number of state courts is leaving no doubt that the model is 
inadequate and inconsistent with fundamental principles of state 
constitutional law. When it comes to state guarantees of educational 
quality, the homevoter model rests on the preservation of the very 
inequality that has led to judicial invalidations of state school financing 
schemes.  
C. State Funding and Local Options 
The data on school inequality,277 the experiences of state funding 
reforms,278 and strong normative arguments279 combine to make a 
powerful case for limiting the taxing and spending options of wealthy 
school districts. As the experiences of Texas and Vermont suggest, 
however, legislative caps and recapture plans are not easily implemented 
as part of a local property tax system. The examples of Kansas, Wyoming, 
and Washington (as well as Vermont’s recently amended Act 60), with 
their abolition of the local property tax for school funding, suggest that the 
solution may lie not in the adoption of funding reforms that preserve local 
 277. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 11, 64.  
 278. See supra note 57. The sources cited in this note make varying conclusions about the success 
of school funding reform, but most agree that the gap between wealthy and poor remains, and may 
even have widened, in states whose courts have issued equalization orders. Moreover, the fact that 
school funding litigation is pending or planned in forty-five states certainly suggests that existing 
school finance reforms have not solved the problems that led to the original lawsuits in the 1970s. See 
David Brunori, Political, Legal Crises Plague School Finance, 20 ST. TAX NOTES 339, 340 (2001). 
 279. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 77–78.  
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ownership while forcing wealthy districts to redistribute what they 
invariably view as their own property, but rather in a more straightforward 
divestment of the local property tax itself. Once the revenues are no longer 
“owned” by the districts, the statewide debate over how best to spend 
limited school dollars appears to proceed to the pressing task of 
determining how to allocate funds in response to educational needs, rather 
than as a function of district property wealth.280
With its call for state funding of education, this Article makes no new 
proposals.281 Where it may differ from the typical proposal for state 
funding, however, is in its suggestion of two important components that 
build on the experiences of the states described in Section III.282 
Fundamentally, those experiences suggest that so long as state law 
preserves the link between local property wealth and school revenues, 
state reforms will never eliminate the gross disparities in revenues and in 
educational quality that pervade most state school systems. Thus, this 
Article urges the adoption of a uniform statewide property tax, whose 
revenues will be allocated according to state distribution formulas rather 
than according to the wealth of the property within the state’s school 
districts, to replace the local property tax.283 Second, starting from that 
equalized base, the Article recognizes the force of wealthy districts’ desire 
to spend lavishly on their own children. Drawing on important insights on 
the patterns of consumer spending,284 it agrees that an absolute prohibition 
of luxury spending in school finance is similarly unlikely to succeed. 
 280. In a recent article, Jeffrey Metzler has suggested that “adoption of a nominally more 
progressive school finance formula will not necessarily result in a more equitable allocation of 
education resources. To achieve this latter goal, courts and reformers must dig deeper, and they must 
focus on changing the political dynamics that perpetuate the inequitable equilibrium of school 
finance.” Metzler, supra note 107, at 564. Severance of the link between property district wealth and 
school revenues would certainly require a profound change in the political dynamics of the state. 
Without such a paradigm shift, according to Metzler, school funding reform will continue to drift back 
to the point of “inequitable equilibrium . . . [which] permits wealthy districts, even at lower tax rates, 
to spend more per student than poor districts.” Id.  
 281. See, e.g., Augenblick, supra note 17; John C. Reitz, Public School Financing in the United 
States: More on the Dark Side of Intermediate Structures, 1993 BYU L. REV. 623, 624. 
 282. See supra notes 104–255 and accompanying text.  
 283. In his student note, Professor Kirk Stark argued for a partial statewide property tax. Stark 
proposed a division between residential and non-residential property, with all non-residential property 
tax revenues paid to the state and preservation of local property taxation for residential property. See 
Stark, supra note 268.  
 284. See FRANK, supra note 20. Professor Frank’s theory of luxury fever spending are described 
in supra notes 20 and 126. Because of the negative impact of luxury spending on overall societal 
welfare, Id. at 66–67, and because of the documented failures of government attempts to prohibit 
luxury spending, Id. at 199–201, Frank proposed a simple consumption tax that would be sufficiently 
progressive to establish meaningful restraints on the rate of luxury consumption. Id. at 211–19.  
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Thus, this Article suggests that wealthy districts be permitted to spend 
beyond the state equalized rate, but only at a steeply graduated tax rate.  
The experiences of Texas and Vermont (under its original Act 60) 
illustrate the difficulties inherent in a system that both preserves local 
ownership of property tax wealth while requiring massive redistribution of 
locally generated revenues. It may be an impossible balance to preserve, 
particularly in tight economic times, because it relies on the forced 
generosity of taxpayers to hand over large amounts of locally generated 
revenues to districts whose revenue raising capabilities are much inferior. 
One Vermont politician has suggested that the real problem is that the 
Robin Hood schemes are just too “in your face” to be tolerated by the 
wealthy owners.285 In contrast, when the state accomplishes the 
redistribution by altering the level at which the tax is generated, though the 
initial outcry may be just as strenuous, the level of political opposition 
appears to decrease over time.286
Although many might agree that the local property tax is an 
inappropriate funding source for today’s schools, the debate over its 
replacement shows little consensus. As a growing number of states 
reshape their school finance statutes by replacing the local property tax, 
they must find new or increased state tax revenues. Some states have 
increased their general sales tax or income tax,287 while others have turned 
to a more narrow source of funds such as lottery revenues.288 Perhaps 
because of the widespread public hatred of the property tax,289 though, 
school funding reformers frequently promise to reduce or eliminate the 
property tax. When that happens, schools must compete at the state 
 285. See Rebell & Metzler, supra note 86, at 187 n.131.  
 286. Consider, for instance, a Wyoming newspaper’s description of the impact of a recent natural 
gas boom on some Wyoming towns. Under Wyoming school funding laws, when the property tax 
revenue generated by local wealth exceeds a state-mandated amount, the excess is used by the state for 
its general education fund and redistribution to poorer districts. The state constitution, however, caps 
the state’s ability to redistribute local revenues; when they exceed a certain amount, the surplus must 
remain at the local level. The limit has rarely been met. In a newspaper article describing how the gas 
fields in the town of Pinedale were going to generate property tax revenues that would be immune 
from state recapture, the town’s fortunate situation was described as a “windfall.” See Rob Shaul, 
Pinedale Schools Set to Receive $8 Million Windfall, THE PINEDALE ROUNDUP, Feb. 20, 2003, 
available at http://meek.sublette.com/roundup/v97n21/v9721s2.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2005). Though 
certainly anecdotal, it suggests a shift in the popular perception of who owns what.  
 287. See Robinson, supra note 52, at 517.  
 288. Id. at 518.  
 289. A recent compilation of the results of more than 25 years of polling the American public on 
issues related to taxes suggests that the local property tax and the federal income tax consistently rank 
the two most hated taxes. See AM. ENTER. INST., AEI STUDIES IN PUBLIC OPINION, PUBLIC OPINION 
ON TAXES, Rule 18.2.1(g) 7–8 (2004), available at http://www.aei.org/ publication16838  (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2005). 
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legislative level for all of their dollars with the many other state agencies 
and constituencies that are lobbying for funding for other pressing public 
needs. At that point, the give and take of legislative budget deals 
inevitably falls on schools as well. In fact, overall school funding levels 
frequently drop when the state assumes greater responsibility for 
education.290 Though undoubtedly disappointing to school advocates, the 
explanation seems straightforward: when a government service has to 
compete for its budget dollars with the demands of other agencies and 
departments, it receives less money than it would if its revenue stream 
were separated and guaranteed.291
A statewide property tax for schools makes sense for a number of 
reasons. First, its revenue producing potential is fairly predictable and 
stable over time.292 Moreover, it provides legislators with a source of 
funding that can be pledged exclusively to schools, thus reducing the 
vulnerability of school revenues in statehouse budget battles.293 In 
addition, though the property tax may be unpopular, state control can 
eliminate its most objectionable features. As a statewide tax, it would be 
levied at a uniform rate, thus eliminating the complaints of those 
(particularly non-homevoters, such as owners of commercial and industrial 
property) who see wide disparity in the tax burden imposed on property of 
identical value in different communities around the state.294 Moreover, a 
 290. For example, the shift to partial statewide funding, triggered in large part by the Doran 
decision, see supra note 129 and accompanying text, has not resulted in increased revenues for 
Washington’s schools. In fact, when adjusted for inflation, the state actually gave schools $115 less 
per student in 2002 than it did a decade earlier. See Linda Shaw & Jolayne Houtz, Education in Budget 
Bind, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at A1. These numbers mean that Washington has slipped from its 
1992 ranking at about the national average; in 2002, it was spending about $400 per student below that 
average. Id. Professor Michael Heise, however, has described the claims about the impact of 
successful school funding litigation on the level of statewide spending on education as “murky and 
unsettled.” Heise, Hollow Victories, supra note 26, at 590. He reviews numerous statistical studies that 
reach conflicting conclusions. Id. at 590–97.  
 291. The term “full line forcing” is used to describe this phenomenon. For a full explanation, see 
Kathryn A. Foster, The Political Economy of Special-Purpose Government, in AMERICAN 
GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 189–217 (Barry Rabe & John Tierny eds., 1997); see also Heise, 
Hollow Victories, supra note 26, at 590–91.  
 292. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 51, at 548–51; cf. Robinson, supra note 51, at 514. 
 293. For instance, even in the profoundly anti-tax state of California, taxpayers appear to agree 
that education funding should be segregated and protected. Proposition 98, a California law adopted by 
voter initiative, guarantees that a certain percentage of the state budget will be spent on elementary and 
secondary education. The actual amount is calculated by a formula that “depends on recent economic 
growth, enrollment changes, projections of state revenues and income per capita.” Kramer, supra note 
35, at 20.  
 294. The equality of tax rate for businesses was an important selling point in the passage of the 
amendments to Vermont’s Act 60. See New Education Funding Law Will Make a Big Difference, THE 
HERALD, June 5, 2003, at 1; Nancy Remsen, School Tax Law’s Winners, Losers, BURLINGTON FREE 
PRESS, June 1, 2003, at 1A (noting hotel owner’s support of new law because it establishes the same 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/3













state property tax can be adjusted for owners whose property holdings far 
outstrip their income stream, particularly the elderly and some family 
farmers.295  
For many who advocate funding schools with the local property tax, 
the asserted loss of local control is reason enough to reject a state property 
tax. Local control of schools has a long and venerable tradition, and the 
values of localism are recognized by courts296 and commentators297 alike. 
In fact, the local control argument has been important since the earliest 
school funding cases; the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to invalidate 
local property tax funding of schools was based in no small part on its 
appreciation of the importance of local control to the quality of local 
schools.298 Without closer inspection, however, the local control argument 
masks the essential inequality on which it is built. Local control is not the 
same thing for all school districts—for the wealthy it brings the ability to 
generate (and spend) high levels of revenue at much lower rates than 
districts with less property value within their borders. When the term 
“local control” is used to describe the ability to self-tax and spend, it 
becomes a cruel joke for districts where even a high tax rate will not 
tax rate statewide).  
 295. Vermont’s statewide property tax levy is adjusted for those whose income is below a certain 
point. See Remsen, supra note 294, at 1A (describing how school funding law now provides a tax 
credit for households with incomes less than $75,000).  
 296. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 51, at 81–124. 
 297. In the legal literature, Professor Gerald Frug is the preeminent defender of localism as the 
level of government at which democratic ideals can most easily be realized. See Gerald E. Frug, The 
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980). For discussion and critique of Frug’s 
localism, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–3, 56 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal 
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 389–406 (1990); Reynolds, supra note 74, at 106–08. 
 298. The Supreme Court’s refusal to upset Texas’ local property tax system of school finance 
rested in no small part on its high opinion of local control:  
The persistence of attachment to government at the lowest level where education is concerned 
reflects the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part, local control means . . . the 
freedom to devote more money to the education of one’s children. Equally important, 
however, is the opportunity it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that 
determines how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor local 
programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, 
innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the Nation-
State relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis 
identified as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State’s freedom to 
“serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.” 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49–50 (internal citation omitted). 
 Note, though, that financial autonomy is but one of the important components of local control 
mentioned by the Court. All of the other aspects it described would not necessarily be affected by a 
shift in the level of funding of education from local to state.  
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generate adequate revenues to educate the district’s children.299 Unless 
local control is redefined to exclude the ability to rely on local revenues 
for local school funding, it will preserve the inequality inherent in the 
property tax system. Properly defined, local control is an important, 
perhaps essential, component of public education: in the context of 
schools, the virtues of localism translate into hands-on involvement by 
local citizens, investments of time and energy into the shape of local 
education, and deliberation over the proper use of tax dollars.300 
Disconnecting the funding source from the local district’s boundaries 
merely democratizes local control by giving all districts the same 
important decision-making power over the education of their children.301
In an ideal world, all schools would be able to offer equal facilities and 
educational opportunities to their students. In our real world, however, the 
force of the economics of consumption suggests that some minimal 
tolerance of local options to over tax and spend is acceptable or perhaps 
even essential. Just as Professor Frank’s proposal for a Luxury Fever tax302 
recognized the indisputable power of the drive to spend in our market 
economy, so too should state law tolerate the desires of wealthy districts to 
spend more on their children’s education than what state tax revenues will 
buy. This power, however, must be carefully limited and narrowly defined 
to ensure that the Luxury Fever option remains a small exception to the 
 299. See Dorothy A. Brown, Deconstructing Local Control: Ohio’s Contribution, 25 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 1 (1996). Professor Brown quotes the concurring opinion of an Ohio Supreme Court justice, in 
which he described the local control argument as nothing more than a “cruel illusion.” Id. at 26 (citing 
DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 777 (Douglas, J., concurring)). The majority opinion in that case, which 
invalidated the Ohio school funding formulas, was equally unimpressed by the local control argument, 
referring to it as a “cliche.” DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d. at 746.  
 300. Professor Frank’s Luxury Fever model similarly recognized the importance of non-monetary 
forms of spending, arguing that his luxury tax would provide incentives for consumers to forego 
increased monetary income and to pursue alternative forms of spending. FRANK, supra note 20, at 277. 
Alternatives, in his view, would tend toward “less-conspicuous forms of consumption,” whose rewards 
consist of well being that is not captured by the standard monetary calculation of income. Id. at 235. 
Examples include working less to enjoy more leisure time or choosing to pursue a meaningful career 
whose income value may be lower than those that provide high market incentives. Id. at 235–39. 
Translated to the context of schools, Frank’s insights suggest that taxing luxury spending by wealthy 
school districts would produce a similar incentive to pursue non-monetary forms of educational 
improvement.  
 301. In today’s world, it would be a mistake to overstate the importance of any measure of “local 
control” to public education. Both state and federal laws create numerous regulatory burdens that 
school districts must shoulder but cannot control. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 51, at 423–
24; Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Difference Masquerading as Discourse and 
the Tyranny of the Locality in State Judicial Review of Education Finance, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 231, 
280–82 (1998); Charles F. Faber, Local Control of the Schools, Still a Viable Option?, 14 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 447, 450–58 (1991).  
 302. For a fuller explanation of Professor Frank’s proposal for a Luxury Fever tax, and his 
explanation of the “smart for one, dumb for all” phenomenon that undergirds it, see supra note 108.  
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rule of equalized state funding. Only if the local option is superimposed on 
a statewide property tax, available to the wealthy districts only after the 
state has levied (and redistributed) the property tax, will the local option 
be prevented from turning the exception of Luxury Fever spending into the 
rule of wealthy district control of local revenues.303
In Professor Frank’s Luxury Fever world of private consumption, 
consumers’ luxury spending would be taxed at a high rate with the 
revenues redistributed by the government.304 In the world of school 
funding, this Article proposes that state legislatures would have greater 
flexibility in determining how to limit the luxury spending of wealthy 
districts. A straightforward analogue to Frank’s Luxury Fever tax is 
possible and uncomplicated, as the state would merely have to determine a 
rate of state taxation to apply to the generation of local property tax 
revenues.305 Under that method, of every dollar of surplus revenues 
generated by the local district for its schools, the state would take a 
uniform percentage. A somewhat more sophisticated approach, one that 
incorporates the district power equalizer306 method of generating revenues 
for excess local district spending, would further equalize the revenue 
raising potential of excess levies for all districts. That is, much as 
Vermont’s amended Act 60 now provides,307 the increase in school funds 
generated by a local levy would depend, not on the value of the property 
situated in the district, but rather on the percentage increase of the levy, 
with all districts guaranteed the same amount for an equal tax levy. Either 
way, whether through a straightforward luxury tax or with the added 
equalization inherent in a district power equalizer, the cap on wealthy 
district spending would both stem the increase of spending at the top and 
would produce more revenues for statewide redistribution. 
 303. The example of Washington, shows how caps and state funding do not necessarily produce 
increased or more equalized funding. Though the state has a statewide property tax, it constitutes a 
small percentage of overall school funding sources. Moreover, Washington’s caps are not really caps; 
they allow substantial local district override, where school districts are free to generate substantial 
local option budgets. It is not surprising, that the gap between rich and poor in Washington has 
returned to its pre-litigation magnitude. See supra notes 128–45 and accompanying text. 
 304. Frank proposed a simple one-line amendment to the tax laws, which would categorize all 
income as either saved (and not taxed) or spent (and taxed at a steeply graduated rate). FRANK, supra 
note 20, at 211–19.  
 305. Vermont’s original Act 60 imposed this kind of tax, producing what was dubbed the “sharing 
pool,” that is, revenues generated locally that were transferred to poorer school districts. See supra 
180–213 and accompanying text.  
 306. See supra note 36.  
 307. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text (describing how Vermont authorizes luxury 
spending pursuant to a district power equalizer formula, thus adding a layer of progressivity to its 
admittedly regressive allowance of luxury spending).  
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The proposal to allow any luxury spending on schools is, of course, a 
concession to the anti-equalizing forces of property wealth and may be 
rejected by those who hold steadfastly to the equality norm in school 
finance. The local option levy, even if equalized in its results, is likely to 
be taken only by school districts with ample wealth. Its justification lies 
not in its doctrinal defensibility, but rather in its pragmatic concession to 
the power of wealth and local control.  
V. CONCLUSION: STRIVING FOR MEANINGFUL SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 
The failure of equalization orders to produce equality in schools and 
the inadequacy that continues to plague the school systems of many states 
whose courts have invalidated numerous funding schemes suggests that 
the current predominant trajectory does not bode well for meaningful 
school funding reform. The seemingly unending conundrum of school 
funding reform stems from two inescapable facts: (1) most of the country 
remains highly segregated on the basis of wealth,308 and (2) state 
legislatures are unwilling or unable to spend on poor schools what the 
wealthy already spend on their own.309 As school finance litigation shows 
no signs of abating; as some states are immersed in the second, third, or 
fourth iteration of cases that began more than 35 years ago; and as school 
 308. If school districts were of relatively equal property value, the use of the local property tax 
would in fact redistribute revenue across the district. In today’s highly segregated society, however, 
local borders segregate according to wealth. The Texas Supreme Court noted how changing 
demographics rendered the Texas property tax system unconstitutional for public schools:  
If our state’s population had grown at the same rate in each district and if the taxable wealth 
in each district had also grown at the same rate, efficiency could probably have been 
maintained within the structure of the present system. That did not happen. Wealth, in its 
many forms, has not appeared with geographic symmetry. The economic development of the 
state has not been uniform. Some cities have grown dramatically, while their sister 
communities have remained static or have shrunk. Formulas that once fit have been knocked 
askew. Although local conditions vary, the constitutionally imposed state responsibility for an 
efficient education system is the same for all citizens regardless of where they live. 
Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 396. A Kansas trial court has made a similar observation: “When the 
assets of the state consisted virtually entirely of unimproved prairie land, and when school districts had 
about equal amounts of that, the property tax likely resulted in reasonably equal educational 
opportunities for every child.” Montoy, 2003 WL 22902963 at *13. For a comprehensive 
documentation of the extent of racial and socioeconomic segregation in public education, see Ryan, 
Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 34, at 272–84. The website of Harvard’s Civil Rights Project 
contains numerous statistics about the resegregation of America’s schools, see, for example, GARY 
ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN 
SCHOOLS (1999), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Resegregation 
_American&uscore;Schools99.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2005). 
 309. See STATE EFFORTS, supra note 9, at 5; Gail F. Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative 
Approaches to Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 522 (1991).  
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funding reforms appear not to satisfy the taxpayers, the courts, or the 
consumers of public education, it may be time for reevaluation of the ways 
in which most state laws leave untouched the ability of wealthy districts to 
tax and spend to their hearts’ content. This central feature of school 
funding produces a never-ending upward spiral of spending by wealthy 
districts that leaves state legislatures in a permanent scramble to patch 
together funds for the poorer districts for which the discretion to tax and 
spend is a meaningless catchall phrase.310  
Moreover, unrestrained school district discretion to tax and spend 
unwisely incorporates the consumer model of local government into the 
states’ constitutional obligations to provide quality education to all 
children. Short of an overwhelmingly massive infusion of state funds, 
severing the link between property wealth and school revenues is the only 
way to ensure that the current gaps will be eliminated. And, as the 
experience of the relatively rare caps and recapture states has revealed, 
even those mechanisms can be inadequate to the task. So long as caps are 
riddled with exceptions and amenable to local option overrides they will 
never impose a meaningful limit on the spending of wealthy districts. 
Finally, as the volatile political experiences of Texas and Vermont 
suggest, legislative commitment to limit wealthy district spending through 
the imposition of a recapture plan, superimposed on a system of locally 
generated and owned property tax revenues is problematic. While it may 
produce the desired leveling of spending statewide, it is likely to produce 
never-ending opposition by wealthy districts, whose taxpayers feel 
unfairly singled out to bear the burden of improving the quality of 
education available to other people’s children. Only if the state is willing 
to change the level at which the tax is levied, by definitively ending the 
local ownership of property tax revenues, is meaningful reform likely to 
succeed. As the courts of Kansas and Wyoming appear poised to follow 
the bold equalizing lead of the Vermont courts and legislature, the 
prevalent laissez-faire attitude to wealthy school district spending may 
have lost some of its luster as an unquestioned feature of school finance. 
With the adoption of a uniform statewide property tax and use of Professor 
Frank’s Luxury Fever insights to limit the taxing options of wealthy 
districts, school finance statutes would change the trajectory of current 
spending patterns and make meaningful strides towards reducing the 
disparity between wealthy and poor districts. 
 310. See STATE EFFORTS, supra note 9, at 7 (noting how analysis of spending patterns in four 
states leads to conclusion that “without constraints on local tax efforts, increases in states’ equalization 
efforts may prompt districts to adjust their tax effort in a way that undermines the equalization effort”). 
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The call for a statewide property tax is likely to be met with intense 
opposition from the districts that stand to lose significant revenues as they 
lose control over the property wealth within their borders. This opposition, 
though limited to a small numbers of districts, will be powerful indeed;311 
thus some pragmatic accommodation is warranted. Absolute equalization 
is likely to produce avoidance behaviors, such as opting out of the public 
school system or establishing foundations that can provide additional 
revenue to wealthy districts, that will be detrimental to the overall quality 
of education statewide.312 Thus, in a pragmatic vein of recognizing the 
power of wealth, states should allow the wealthy districts to continue to 
engage in some luxury spending, but that spending should be steeply 
taxed. This limited recognition of local option spending, though it may 
cater to the whims of the wealthy districts, is less likely to produce the 
same gaps that have resulted in the caps states described earlier. That is 
because, first, the local options proposed here would be superimposed, not 
on the entrenched inequality seen in the earlier review of school finance 
caps, but rather on the equalized base that comes from the statewide 
property tax. Second, and again in contrast to the caps adopted across the 
country, the proposed luxury tax on that local option spending would both 
slow the rate at which luxury spending increases and also produce 
revenues that can be used by the state on districts whose property value 
makes local option spending impossible. 
Though limiting the spending of wealthy districts is a crucial element 
of meaningful school reform, it is not a magic bullet. Equally important is 
the concurrent long-term effort to broaden the stakeholders in public 
education. As the stereotypical model of the two-parent family with 
children, owning a single family home and enthusiastically supporting 
schools at great personal cost in tax payments becomes less the 
demographic norm, education needs a constituency that extends well 
beyond the group of people with children.313 A move to statewide funding 
 311. Even though 89% of Vermont taxpayers saw reduced property tax bills with the passage of 
Act 60, the political opposition was powerful and sustained. One legislator uses an insight from 
Macchiavelli to explain how a law that benefited so many people was nevertheless ultimately put on 
the political chopping block: “Major changes make the losers very angry, but elicit only lukewarm 
support from the beneficiaries because most people fundamentally don’t trust change.” Rebell & 
Metzler, supra note 86, at 184 (from a telephone interview with Paul Cillo, formerly Majority Leader 
of the Vermont House of Representatives). 
 312. Professor Clayton Gillette, who generally supports the application of market principles to the 
provision of government services, has recognized that exercise of individual choice to defect from 
public schools could have serious negative societal impacts. See Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of 
Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185, 1213–14 (1996). 
 313. See Schomberg, supra note 11, at 178. 
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of education opens the door for a broader, statewide support for education 
from the business community and from the general citizenry, which may 
be more interested in raising the level of educational achievement 
generally than in preserving luxury school district spending for a small 
segment of the state. Evidence about how all of society will pay the cost of 
inadequate education, with increased state funds needed to combat higher 
levels of crime, unemployment, and welfare, can be highlighted more 
easily at the state level.314 Moreover, with the property tax rate equalized 
across the state for all businesses, the level playing field eliminates the 
often-heard criticism that, because of variation in local property tax rates 
across the state, some businesses contribute far more than others to public 
education. 
Of course, this Article’s two-pronged proposal for a statewide property 
tax coupled with a steeply taxed local option to engage in luxury spending 
will not, by itself, solve the problems of public education. It does nothing 
to address, for instance, the corrosive and destructive effect of hyper-
segregation that plagues most inner city and wealthy suburban schools.315 
Nor does it provide answers to the unresolved questions about the 
correlation between spending and educational quality.316 What it does, 
however, is suggest a reform that would radically change school finance in 
most states and that would provoke a shift in the school finance debate. 
With the link between property wealth and school revenues definitively 
broken, educators, legislators, and taxpayers could move to the next 
difficult step in the process, turning their attention to the task of improving 
educational quality and making sure that all children’s needs are accounted 
for in state funding formulas. So long as that link remains unbroken, the 
enormous gap between wealthy and poor districts will endure, and with it, 
the inevitable litigation filed to force states to live up to their constitutional 
obligation to create a system of school finance that guarantees that 
education is truly “available to all on equal terms.”317
 314. Though local policy making has a long track record of responding only to short-term, and not 
long-term costs and benefits, the long term benefits of increased educational quality may find greater 
resonance at the statewide level. See Gottlieb, supra note 266. 
 315. The work of Professor James Ryan deals with the impact of funding reforms on racial and 
educational equality. See, e.g., Ryan, Race and Money, supra note 34, at 249; Ryan, supra note 93, at 
432; Ryan & Heise, supra note 48, at 2043.  
 316. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 317. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
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